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The Draft Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts includes a
quantitative study of judicial decisions concerning businesses’ online privacy
policies, which it cites in support of a claim that most courts treat privacy
policies as contract terms. This Article reports an attempt to reproduce that
study’s results. Using the Reporters’ data, this study was unable to reproduce
their numerical findings. This study found in the data fewer relevant decisions,
and a lower proportion of decisions supporting the Draft Restatement position.
It also found little support for the Draft’s claim that there is a clear trend
recognizing privacy policies as contracts, and none for the claim that those
decisions have been more influential than decisions coming out the other way. A
qualitative analysis of the decisions in the dataset reveals additional issues.
The analysis reveals that the Draft Restatement study’s numerical results
obscure both the many judgment calls needed to code the decisions and their
limited persuasive power. These results confirm the importance of transparency
and replication in empirical case law studies. They also suggest that the closed
nature of the Restatement process is perhaps ill-suited to producing reliable
large-scale quantitative case law studies.
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Introduction
The draft Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts (“the Draft
Restatement” or “the Draft”) invokes six quantitative studies of judicial
decisions. Each study seeks to collect all available decisions on a legal question,
published and unpublished; codes those decisions for factors such as issue,
outcome, procedural posture, jurisdiction, and citations; and analyzes the coded
data to determine majority rules, trends, lines of influence, and other patterns.
The Reporters explain the advantages of their quantitative method as follows:
Using a quantitative analysis of all published decisions in state and federal courts,
as well as unpublished decisions reported on Westlaw and Lexis, the Restatement
distills the principles that most courts articulate and follow in adjudicating the
most novel and contentious issues in consumer-contract law. By looking at all
these cases and carefully organizing them by their outcomes, rationales, and
influence, this methodology makes it possible to decipher with greater subtlety
the preeminent patterns within the law and measure their impact.1

1.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONSUMER CONTRACTS, Reporters’ Introduction at 6
(AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 4, 2017) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT]. On October 19, 2018,
Omri Ben Shahar tweeted that “the ALI council approved UNANIMOUSLY our draft of the Restatement
of Consumer Contracts.” Omri Ben-Shahar (@omribenshahar), TWITTER (Oct. 19, 2018, 7:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/omribenshahar/status/1053294333057814530 [https://perma.cc/9CYH-7NEP]. As of
the final editing of this Article, the ALI has not published a draft subsequent to the version discussed and
quoted herein. To the best of my knowledge, two subsequent drafts have been circulated within the ALI,
though they have not yet been made public.
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The six quantitative case law studies in the Draft address: (1) whether a
business’s privacy policy is part of its contract with a consumer; whether and
when (2) clickwrap terms, (3) browsewrap terms, or (4) shrinkwrap terms
become part of the contract; (5) whether and when a business can modify a
contract without express consumer consent; and (6) application of the parol
evidence rule to standard terms in consumer contracts.2
This Article reports the results of an attempt to reproduce the numerical
results of the Reporters’ study of whether courts treat business privacy policies
as part of their contracts with the consumer. It also provides a qualitative analysis
of the decisions in the Reporters’ dataset, how those decisions were coded, and
their persuasive authority. I chose to analyze the privacy policy study because
the Reporters were kind enough to provide the data and some of their coding for
it. In addition to describing in the Draft Restatement the study’s results, the
Reporters have published the results in the University of Chicago Law Review.3
How companies use consumer information is today a highly salient topic.
As illustrated by Cambridge Analytica’s reported uses of Facebook data in the
2016 election cycle, we do not have a complete understanding of the potential
costs, individual and social, of permitting businesses to sell, share, or otherwise
use data that they harvest from consumers. How businesses use consumer data,
the legal effect of their disclosure of such uses in posted “privacy policies,” and
the mechanisms of consumer consent to such uses are all important topics of
public discussion.
In the European Union, a business’s use of consumer data is governed by
the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).4 The GDPR addresses how
businesses store and protect consumer information and establishes default limits
on how they may share it. The GDPR also provides rules for how a business can
obtain legally effective consumer consent to otherwise prohibited information
sharing. For example, a “request for consent shall be presented in a manner
which is clearly distinguishable from . . . other matters, in an intelligible and

2.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13-15 (cases embracing privacy
notices as creating contractual obligations are more numerous and influential); § 2, Reporters’ Notes at
34 (out of 110 cases, courts have enforced clickwrap contracts in each one absent fraud, unconscionability,
or another intervening factor); § 2, Reporters’ Notes at 35-36 (notice and opportunity to review are
required for browsewrap contracts to be enforceable); § 2, Reporters’ Notes at 38 (enforcement of paynow-terms-later contracts are increasingly numerous and influential as long as there is no fraud,
unconscionability, etc.); § 3, Reporters’ Notes at 47 (modifications in consumer transactions are
consistently enforceable with notice and opportunity to reject); § 8 Reporters’ Notes at 95-96 (cases where
consumer standard-form contracts create a rebuttable presumption of integration are more likely to be
cited than those where such a presumption is conclusive).
3.
Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the
Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
7 (2017). The University of Chicago Law Review has not made available the data or coding for the studies
described in this Article. The editors did not respond to an inquiry about their cite-checking process.
4.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
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easily accessible form, using clear and plain language,”5 and “consent should be
given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed
and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of
personal data relating to him or her.”6
There exists no analogous general law of data privacy in the United States.
Instead, a business’s use of its consumers’ information is subject to a patchwork
of federal and state laws. Nor is U.S. law today clear on when a consumer has
effectively consented to an otherwise impermissible use of her information.
Among other things, it is not yet settled whether the fact that a business provides
notice of how it uses consumer information—for example, by posting its privacy
policy online—establishes effective consumer consent to that use. There have,
however, been moves toward adopting heightened requirements for effective
consumer consent. California has required, and the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission has recommended, that such notices be conspicuous and drafted in
easily understood language.7 And the American Law Institute (ALI) is currently
working on a Principles of the Law, Data Privacy, which will address
mechanisms of consent.8
All of this is relevant to understanding the Draft Restatement of the Law of
Consumer Contract’s statements on privacy policies. Comment 9 to section 1
provides that a business’s posted privacy policy can become a term in a consumer
contract in accordance with the rules of the Restatement.9 Judicial adoption of
such a rule would have significant consequences. Section 2 of the Draft describes
a low bar for consumer assent to standard terms. A “business may establish how
the assent may be manifested, as long as the manner and medium are reasonable
in the circumstances.”10 Legally effective manifestations can include not
returning a product after receiving terms (shrinkwrap)11 and entering a place of
business or using a website where the business provides reasonable notice of the
terms and an opportunity to review them (e.g., browsewrap).12 Together with the
proposed comment, it follows that a business’s posted privacy policies would
often become part of its contract with the consumer.13 Whereas European law
establishes heightened requirements for effective consumer consent to the
sharing of their information, the Draft Restatement suggests applying its generic
minimal requirements for contractual assent to a business’s use of the
consumer’s information.
5.
Id. art. 7, at 37.
6.
Id. § 32, at 6.
7.
See infra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
8.
See infra text accompanying note 46.
9.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, cmt. 9.
10.
Id. § 2, cmt. 2.
11.
Id. § 2(b).
12.
Id. § 2, cmt. 5.
13.
See id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13 (“[P]rivacy policies posted by businesses, that
govern a business’s data collection, use, and protection practices . . . are consumer contracts and the
Restatement’s rules apply to them.”).
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Of course, one cannot fault comment 9 if it accurately describes the rule
U.S. courts apply. Although Restatements have sometimes staked out positions
ahead of the courts,14 the express purpose of a Restatement is to restate existing
law. Thus the importance of evaluating the Reporters’ authority for the proposed
comment 9. The Reporters’ Notes to section 1 identify one state appellate
decision and two federal district court decisions whose logic the Reporters find
“compelling.”15 But the Notes do not discuss the reasoning of those decisions. I
argue in Section II.C that they provide little or no support for the proposed
comment. The only other legal authority the Reporters provide for comment 9 is
a quantitative study of fifty-one decisions between 2004 and 2015. The Reporters
conclude from that study that courts are seven times more likely to recognize a
privacy policy as part of a consumer contract than to exclude it from the contract;
that there is a clear and increasing trend toward treating privacy policies as
contract terms; and that decisions adopting this position have been more
influential than those disagreeing with it. This study is in fact the principle
authority for the proposed comment on privacy policies.
This Article examines the Reporters’ coding and quantitative analysis of
those cases and concludes that the empirical support for comment 9 is not nearly
as strong as the Reporters suggest. Independent coding of the cases in the
Reporters’ dataset provided starkly different quantitative results. A qualitative
analysis of the decisions that arguably support the proposed comments finds that
they are of limited authoritative or persuasive power.
There are several significant differences between this study’s quantitative
results and those of the Reporters. First, using very generous coding criteria, I
find that only fifteen of the fifty-one decisions in the Reporters’ dataset address
the question they pose. The Reporters find forty. Second, whereas the Reporters
find that courts are seven times more likely than not to recognize that a business’s
privacy policy might be part of its contract with the consumer, I find a ratio of
less than three to one. This weaker result together with the smaller sample
provides significantly less support for the draft comment than the Reporters
describe. Third, my analysis of the data casts doubt on the Reporters’ claim that
there is a clear and increasing trend toward treating privacy policies as contract
terms. Most of the change the Reporters observe occurred between 2004 and
2010. Between 2010 and 2015 the ratio of decisions coded as recognizing
privacy policies as contract terms to those holding that they are not dropped
somewhat. Fourth, the Reporters use of total citation counts to identify leading
cases is flawed. Examination of citing cases reveals that most do not refer to the
supposed leading case for a relevant legal proposition.

14.
Most famous in contract law is section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, which
blazed the trail for the judicial recognition of promissory estoppel. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90
(AM. LAW INST. 1932).
15.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Reporters’ Notes at 13-14.
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Like the Reporters, I find that a majority of relevant decisions in the dataset
allowed that a business’s privacy policy might be part of its contract with a
consumer. It would be wrong, however, to interpret this as confirmation of the
Reporters’ results. The Reporters’ quantitative study seeks to determine how
much support in the case law there is for the draft comment. On the core question
as to what most courts are holding, this study finds a much weaker effect (less
than a three-to-one ratio vs. a seven-to-one ratio) in a much smaller number of
decisions (fifteen vs. forty). This is comparable to the difference between a
baseball team winning eleven of its first fifteen games and a team winning thirtyfive of its first forty games. Both are winning records. But the latter win/loss
ratio provides much more powerful evidence of the team’s ability and likelihood
of success in the season as a whole. Or one might think of the difference in terms
of coin tosses. If a coin is flipped fifteen times, there is a one-in-twenty-four
chance it will come up heads eleven times. If it is flipped forty times, the chance
it will come up heads thirty-five times is approximately one in 1.6 million. Given
the small sample size and weaker effect, this Article’s study cannot reject with a
standard level of certainty the null hypothesis that courts are in fact no more
likely to recognize a privacy policy as a contract than not. And as noted above,
the Draft Restatement emphasizes more than decision counts. It also finds a
“clear and increasing trend towards contractual enforcement of privacy notices,”
and “that cases embracing privacy notices as contracts are not only more
numerous, but more influential.”16 I find little support for the first proposition
and none for the second. In short, the attempt to reproduce the results reported
in the Draft finds that the data do not provide the degree of empirical support
claimed for the proposed comment.
The numbers, however, mask deeper problems with the Reporters’
quantitative study, as revealed by a qualitative analysis of the decisions in the
Reporters’ dataset. The Reporters’ coding appears to contain some significant
errors, such as including cases in which neither party was a consumer and cases
in which there was not even an arguably contract claim or defense. The numerical
results also obscure the many difficult judgment calls needed to code the
decisions in the dataset. Most significant among these is the Reporters’ coding
of cases in which the business invoked its privacy policy as a defense against a
claimed non-contractual privacy violation. Although the Reporters coded these
“shield” decisions as recognizing that the privacy policy could be a contract term,
courts in these cases in fact applied consent rules drawn from tort and statutory
law. Finally, the vast majority of the decisions in the dataset are from federal trial
courts, and two-thirds are on motions to dismiss. These decisions are not binding
on other courts, and their persuasive value is very limited. In fact, many of the
decisions that allow a contract claim to survive a motion to dismiss also include
judicial statements contrary to the rules in the Draft Restatement. In short, even

16.
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if a majority of the coded decisions contain some support for the proposed
comment, the degree of support in those decisions is quite low.
There are four takeaways. First, and most narrowly, this study finds that the
Reporters’ data regarding the judicial treatment of privacy policies do not
adequately support the conclusions they draw or the proposed comment 9. The
case law that the Reporters rely on does not provide sufficient support for their
claim that most courts apply rules described in the Draft Restatement to
determine the legal effect of a business’s privacy policy. Second and perhaps
more significantly, the results of this study suggest that the results of the Draft’s
five other quantitative case law studies should not be considered definitive until
their methods have been examined and their results reproduced. To date, the
Reporters have neither provided a detailed description of their coding methods
nor published their coded data. Without knowing the Reporters’ coding methods,
it is impossible to know how to interpret the numbers they present. And without
the coded data, it is impossible for other researchers to attempt to reproduce their
analysis of it. Third, and even more broadly, the results of this study illustrate
the general importance of transparency and replication in quantitative case law
studies. As the so-called replication crisis in the medical and social sciences
illustrates,17 transparency and replication are essential element of reliable
empiricism. This holds all the more for attempts to code and quantify judicial
holdings. The final lesson concerns the production of Restatements. Part of the
problem here may be the American Law Institute’s procedures, which are not
designed to be transparent or to give scholars outside the ALI an opportunity to
examine or attempt to reproduce empirical results. If the ALI wishes to use
quantitative case law studies in future Restatements, it should consider revising
those procedures.
Part II of this Article provides an introduction to the Restatement of the
Law of Consumer Contracts project and to the Draft’s comment on privacy
policies. Part III describes this Article’s method, presents the results of my
attempt to reproduce the Reporters’ study, and discusses the significance of the
difference between my results and those of the Reporters. Part IV provides a
qualitative analysis of the decisions in the dataset and their coding and draws
conclusions about the strength of the Draft’s evidence for the proposed comment.
Part V steps back and suggests that the American Law Institute’s Restatement
process is not well-suited to the production of quantitative case law studies.
Before jumping into the analysis, a few preliminary words on this Article’s
methods, which Section III.A describes in detail. One approach to replication
would be to perform a completely independent study of judicial decisions that
address whether and when a business’s posted privacy policy becomes part of its
contract with the consumer. Such a study would begin by independently
compiling a set of relevant decisions to check the precision and recall of the
Reporters’ search methods. It would then establish a coding rubric in advance,
17.

See infra note 217.
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employ blind coding, assign each decision to multiple coders, and perform
appropriate interrater reliability checks to ensure the quality of the results.18 This
Article does not report the results of such a study. Instead, I have attempted to
reproduce the Reporters’ results using a more lawyerly form of empiricism. The
Article seeks to determine what the Reporters’ numbers mean, i.e., what those
numbers say about what the law is. The answer to that question requires
examining the underlying data using traditional lawyerly tools. The goal is not
merely to determine whether the Reporters’ results can be replicated, but to
understand them.
I.

Background

A. The Restatement of Consumer Contract Law Project
The Draft Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts seeks to identify
rules specific to adhesive contracts between consumers and the businesses that
sell them goods, software, services, or other products. As the Reporters observe,
business-to-consumer transactions “present a fundamental challenge to the law
of contracts, arising from the asymmetry in information, sophistication, and
stakes between the parties to these contracts.”19 The classical picture of contract,
according to which much of contract law is structured, depicts two parties of
relatively equal bargaining power who negotiate the details of a transaction that
each fully comprehends, and who then expressly agree to the resulting terms. In
the typical consumer contract, in distinction, the business drafts a set of standard
terms, which are often lengthy and written in technical language, without
consumer input. The business then gives those standard terms to many
consumers, all on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The consumer pays attention not to
the standard terms, but to a few primary terms, such as the product’s description
and its price. Whereas the primary terms are put in front of the consumer’s eyes,
the standard terms are listed separately in an accompanying document or on a
linked webpage, or they arrive later with the product. The consumer, who is
focused on primary terms, almost never reads or comprehends the standard
terms, but indicates her assent to them by signing at the bottom of a long
document, by clicking a button labeled “I agree,” by completing the transaction
to which the terms are appended, or by not cancelling the transaction when the
terms arrive. There is a widespread sense that the general rules of contract
enforcement should not apply to such agreements. That sense might come from
the fact that the consumer’s assent to standard terms is of such low quality.20 Or

18.
For a good overview of the methodological issues involved in quantitative empirical
case law studies, see Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions,
96 CAL. L. REV. 63 (2008).
19.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Reporters’ Introduction at 1.
20.
See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012).
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it might come from the asymmetries in information, sophistication, and stakes
that the Reporters emphasize. Legislatures, regulators, and courts have
responded with a host of rules designed specifically for consumer contracts.
Hence the perceived need for a Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts.
The American Law Institute appointed as Reporters for the project Oren
Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar, and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler. All are law
professors who have studied and written on consumer contracts. Professors BarGill and Ben-Shahar both have PhDs in economics and have applied classical
microeconomic analysis and behavioral economics to the study of consumer
contracts. Professor Marotta-Wurgler is perhaps best known for her large-scale
empirical studies of online consumer contracts and contracting behavior.
A central claim of all three Reporters’ scholarship is that it is nearly
impossible to obtain fully informed consumer consent to standard contract
terms.21 These claims cohere with the Draft Restatement’s observations about
recent judicial approaches to consumer contracts:
By and large . . . common-law courts, when applying the common-law rules of
contract, have relaxed the assent rules, permitting businesses to use relatively
lenient adoption processes. Courts have recognized that, in a world of lengthy
standard forms, more restrictive assent rules that demand more thorough advance
disclosures and more meaningful informed consent would increase transaction
costs without producing substantial benefit.22

An obvious worry is that if consumers do not read standard terms, there
will be no check on businesses that wish to add unfair and consumer unfriendly
provisions to the contract—provisions to which a fully informed, rational, and
self-interested consumer would not agree. The Draft’s answer is heightened
judicial scrutiny of the substance of standard terms, especially using the
unconscionability doctrine, to ensure that the terms are fair, reasonable and
conform to consumers’ actual expectations. The Draft calls this the “grand

21.
See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer Transactions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014);
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Yannis Bakos, David R. Trossen & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2014); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract, 4 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 428
(2000); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case
of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2008); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler,
Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 94 (2012); Florencia MarottaWurgler, Does Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s ‘Principles of
the Law of Software Contracts’, 78 U. CHI. L. REV 165, 168 (2011); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Some
Realities of Online Contracting, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 11 (2011); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even
More Than You Wanted to Know About the Failures of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63
(2015); Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883 (2014)
(reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE
OF LAW (2013)).
22.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Reporters’ Introduction at 3.
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bargain”: “fairly unrestricted freedom for businesses to draft and affix their terms
to the transaction, balanced by a set of substantive boundary restrictions,
prohibiting businesses from going too far.”23
Although this grand bargain is consistent with the Reporters’ scholarly
commitments, their argument for it rests on case law. Their approach to that law,
however, again reflects their scholarly expertise. In addition to the traditional
method “of extracting rationales from leading cases and supporting them with
convincing policy justifications,”24 the Reporters’ provide quantitative empirical
analyses of judicial decisions on six questions of law.25 Each study compiles a
dataset of all published and unpublished state and federal decisions on a given
legal question, codes the decisions for variables such as jurisdiction, outcome,
rationale, and number of subsequent citations, then analyzes the coded data to
measure the relative frequency of outcomes and reasoning, trends over time and
the influence of leading decisions. The Restatements have always been partly
empirical projects, as Reporters have relied on citations to multiple cases and
sometimes provided systematic overviews. These Reporters’ quantitative
method purports both to expand the range and to improve the precision of that
empiricism. It seeks to collect all decisions, published and unpublished, on a
given question, and by coding those decisions for multiple variables to identify
patterns that might evade other methods.
As the Reporters observe, the above-described quantitative method “has the
potential to render [the Restatement’s] recommendations more transparent and
reliable.”26 The Reporters identify three more specific advantages of their
quantitative empiricism:
First, it decreases the probability that important or well-reasoned cases might be
missed. Second, it allows Reporters to carefully consider the evolution of the
doctrine to better understand how courts address key issues both at the appellate
level and as applied on the ground. Third, while the empirical approach does not
dictate which principles would ultimately find their way to the black letter of the
Restatement, it can offer supporting evidence and reinforce the restated
principles. This method helps implement a longstanding ALI commitment to
identify majority rules and the best policy approach; the quantitative dimension
is a rigorous way to ground and make transparent the concept of a majority rule.27

The Reporters state that their quantitative method is meant to supplement,
not replace, the traditional qualitative and evaluative empiricism of the

23.
Id. at Reporters’ Introduction at 4; see also id. at 25 (“One of the Restatement’s
methodological cornerstones is the commitment, throughout, to reflect this fundamental tradeoff: as assent
rules shift to the more permissive end of the continuum, courts have perceived greater need and
justification for mandatory restrictions and ex post scrutiny of abusive terms.”).
24.
Id. at Reporters’ Introduction at 6.
25.
See supra note 2.
26.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Reporters’ Introduction at 6.
27.
Id.
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Restatement projects. That said, as I discuss in Section II.C below, the Reporters
lean heavily on their quantitative study to justify the Draft’s comment on privacy
policies.
B. Privacy Policies in the Draft Restatement
Section 1 of the Draft Restatement discusses the scope of the Restatement
of the Law of Consumer Contracts. It provides that a consumer is “[a]n
individual acting primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” and that
a business is “[a]n individual or entity other than a consumer that regularly
participates in or solicits, directly or indirectly, consumer transactions.”28 It
further provides that the Draft Restatement’s rules apply to consumer contracts,
which are “contract[s] between a business and a consumer.”29 Comment 9 to
section 1 addresses privacy policies:
Privacy contracts included. The definition of “Consumer Contract” includes
agreements between a consumer and business with respect to the consumer’s
personal information, such as standard-terms privacy notices relating to a
consumer’s personal information collected, used, shared, protected, or otherwise
handled by the business. The rules of contract law, including the specific rules in
this Restatement, as well as rules not included in this Restatement, apply to
contracts involving personal information.30

The Reporters’ Notes explain that the comment addresses “whether privacy
policies posted by businesses, that govern the business’s data collection, use, and
protection practices, are contracts,” and conclude that “a notice that purports to
create consent-based rights and obligations should be viewed as the subject
matter of a consumer contract, in the same way that notices regarding the scope
of warranty, remedies, or dispute resolution do.”31
From one perspective, the claim that a consumer contract can include
provisions related to use of the consumer’s data is uncontroversial. Contract law
is largely content neutral. Parties can, ceteris paribus, contract for whatever
duties, powers, permissions, and other legal relations they wish. That includes
duties and permissions that relate to information generated in the transaction, as
illustrated by the nondisclosure clauses that commonly appear in other types of
contracts. One does not need an empirical study to show that parties can contract
to expand or reduce one side’s privilege to share information generated in the
transaction.
The significance of the proposed comment 9 is not its affirmation that
consumers and businesses can contract over privacy, but what it says about how

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. §§ 1(a)(1) & (2).
Id. §§ 1(a)(4) & 1(b).
Id. § 1, cmt. 9.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13.
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they can do so. A rule that “[p]rivacy policies are consumer contracts, and the
Restatement’s rules apply to them”32 would bring privacy notices within the
scope of the Draft’s sections 2 and 3, which provide the “grand bargain’s”
relaxed rules for formation and modification. In doing so, the proposed comment
has the potential to displace emerging areas of privacy law, including parts of
the separate ALI project on the Principles of the Law, Data Privacy.
Sections 2 and 3 state rules for contract formation and modification. Section
2 adopts inter alia the ProCD v. Zeidenberg rule for shrinkwrap terms: standard
terms are enforceable even if they are provided to the consumer after the
consumer’s assent to the transaction, so long as the consumer had “reasonable
notice” of their existence prior to that assent and has a “reasonable opportunity
to terminate” after receipt.33 Comment 5 to section 2 addresses browsewrap
terms. “Browsewrap” refers to online terms of use, accessible via a link on a web
page, that stipulate that the consumer’s use of the website shall constitute assent
to those terms. Comment 5 states that under section 2, browsewrap terms are
enforceable so long as the business provides the consumer reasonable notice of
and opportunity to review them.34 Section 3 then provides that modifications are
subject to the section 2 rules for formation, with a proviso in the comments that
“when the initial terms are adopted through a particular process, the consumer
[might] expect the same or a similar process for modifications of the standard
terms,” which could trigger “a heightened notice requirement for the
modification.”35
The implications of including a business’s separately available privacy
policy within the scope of the Draft Restatement therefore include the following.
First, an online policy to which a consumer does not expressly agree and of
which the consumer is unlikely to have read or understood can qualify as
standard terms of the contract. Thus, a consumer who uses a website that includes
a sufficiently prominent link to its privacy policy might be contractually bound
to its provisions. Second, a consumer who receives the privacy policy in a postformation correspondence—say in a follow-up email or mailing after agreeing
to the transaction—would similarly be bound by it, so long as the consumer had
notice of its existence prior to entering the transaction and has a reasonable
opportunity to cancel the transaction after receiving it. Third, a business would
have the power to modify a contractually binding privacy policy without
receiving express consumer assent to that modification, and even in some
instances without actual consumer knowledge of the change. Reasonable notice
32.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13.
33.
Id. § 2(b); see ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
34.
Id. § 2, cmt. 5 (“Standard contract terms governing the proprietary environment of
the business may be adopted as part of a consumer contract upon entry to, or use of, that environment,
even if no other purchase is concluded while in the environment . . . . In such case, entry into the
proprietary environment signifies assent to the transaction, and the consumer’s choice not to exit or
otherwise terminate the transaction leads to the adoption of the posted standard contract terms.”); see also
id. illus. 11 (describing assent to standard terms through use of a website containing a link to those terms).
35.
Id. § 3, cmt. 5.
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could be enough. In short, “a [privacy] notice that purports to create consentbased rights and obligations should be viewed as the subject matter of a
consumer contract, in the same way that notices regarding the scope of warranty,
remedies, or dispute resolution do” under the Draft’s proposed rules.36
In theory, the downstream consequences might be either pro-consumer or
pro-business, depending on the nature of the dispute. The proposed comment
could help consumers by making it easier to sue a business for breach it its own
privacy policy. By lowering the requirements for consumer assent, the Draft’s
approach could make it more likely that courts will hold that a posted policy
binds the business and supports an action for breach. And the comment’s
inclusion of privacy policies should bring them within the Restatement’s
heightened scrutiny for substantive unconscionability—the “grand bargain.”37
In practice, however, the rule is likely to work to the benefit of the
businesses in disputes over their use of consumer information.38 First, treating
privacy policy violations as breaches of contract might have the effect of
displacing other, more consumer-friendly claims and remedies. A business’s
violation of its own privacy policy can also support an action based on the torts
of negligent misrepresentation or deceit, or on a state Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices statute. A consumer might prefer the remedies those laws already
provide to the remedies available for breach. In other contexts, courts have held
that misrepresentations within contracts are not actionable in tort.39
Second, and more importantly, privacy policies do not only impose new
duties on the business. They commonly purport to give the business permission
to use the consumer information in ways otherwise prohibited. There exists a raft
of statutes, regulations, and common law actions that protect consumer
information.40 Businesses often draft privacy policies that purport to permit
otherwise prohibited uses of that information. When a consumer sues for a
privacy violation, the business then points to its published policy as evidence
that the consumer consented to the use. Today such cases are often decided not
by contract law, but by rules governing consent drawn from tort law, statutes,
and regulations.41 Those rules can differ from contractual assent requirements.
The California Online Privacy Act, for example, requires that operators

36.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13.
37.
The proposed section 5 provides, for example, that “a contract term is presumed to
be substantively unconscionable if its effect is to . . . [u]nreasonably limit the consumer’s ability to pursue
a complaint or seek reasonable redress for a violation of a legal right.” DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 5(d)(3).
38.
Whether consumers would also benefit in the form of lower prices is a question far
beyond the scope of this Article.
39.
See Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 722-33 (2006); Gregory Klass, Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, 117 YALE
L.J. 2, 45-49 (2007).
40.
The relevant texts of federal statutes alone take up 470 pages of Marc Rotenberg’s
The Privacy Law Sourcebook: United States Law, International Law and Recent Developments 1-470
(2016).
41.
See discussion of shield decisions infra Sections III.B.3 and IV.B.2.
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“conspicuously post” their privacy policies and provides a detailed list of
sufficient disclosures.42 The Federal Trade Commission has recommended
layered privacy notices with “clearer, shorter, and more standardized”
language,43 and has brought numerous actions based on inadequate notice.44 And
the Michigan Video Rental Privacy Act requires that the consumer’s consent be
in writing.45 Consent rules in privacy law also continue to evolve. The ALI’s
draft Principles of the Law, Data Privacy, for example, recommend requiring
both detailed transparency statements, geared towards regulators, and more
accessible privacy notices, written to be understood by individuals.46 And the
emergence of novel uses of consumer information—such as Cambridge
Analytica’s use of Facebook data in the 2016 U.S. election—might well suggest
new rules.47
None of these correspond to the Draft Restatement’s rules for contractual
assent. Were courts to begin treating privacy policies as standard contract terms
pursuant to the rules described in the Draft’s sections 2 and 3, they might
conclude that non-contractual consent rules are inapposite. Unlike mere consent,
the consumer has agreed to share her data in exchange for a benefit received, and
so the resulting contract should be enforced. In fact, the Draft endorses this logic:
“Increasingly, consumers ‘pay’ for services by allowing businesses to collect
42.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2018).
43.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE 64 (2012).
44.
See, e.g., United States v. Path, Consent Decree and Order, FTC File No. 122 3158
(2013), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1223158/130201pathincdo.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R99-YLM5]; In
re
Facebook,
Complaint,
FTC
File
No.
092
3184
(2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/120810facebookcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4EK-8VRY]; FTC
v. Frostwire, 17 LLC, No. 11-cv-23643 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2011) (complaint),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1123041/111011frostwirecmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE77-YC37]; FTC
v.
Echometrix,
Complaint,
FTC
File
No.
102
3006,
http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023006/101130echometrixcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW96-BZM3] (2010);
see generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
45.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1712(1) & 1713 (a) (2018).
46.
Principles of the Law, Data Privacy §§ 3 & 4 (ALI Council Draft No 1, 2016). The
comments explains:
[T]he Data Privacy Principles distinguish between a “transparency statement” and “individual
notice.” First, a transparency statement, as specified § 3, is aimed at regulators and can assist
them in assessing whether organizations follow the law. Second, it informs the public about
an entity’s policies and practices so that they can be discussed and debated. Third, a
transparency statement binds a data manager to a regular set of practices and prevents it from
acting in a purely ad hoc fashion. It can help an organization understand its own policies and
operationalize them.
In contrast, individual notice, as specified in § 4, is intended to provide information to the
individual whose personal data is processed.
Id. § 3 cmt. a. The Reporters for the Principles have not yet released a draft section 5, the provision that
will address consent.
47.
For an example of the many reflections on the possible changing attitudes toward
consumer privacy in the wake of Cambridge Analytica, see John Herrman, Cambridge Analytica and the
Coming
Data
Bust,
New
York
Times
(April
10,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/magazine/cambridge-analytica-and-the-coming-data-bust.html
[https://perma.cc/GT8Q-CFX3].
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personal information, and it is therefore necessary to regard the personalinformation provisions as part of the contract.”48 This could result in a broader
shift away from rules of consent located in privacy law and toward rules of
contractual assent such as those described in the Draft Restatement. Such a shift
might retard further development of consent rules to address the special concerns
of data privacy. It is therefore important to understand whether the proposed
comment reflects the existing law of consumer contracts—the rules that courts
are actually applying—or if it represents a proposed innovation or intervention.
C. The Draft’s Nonquantitative Arguments for Comment 9
As noted above, the Reporters state in their Introduction that “the empirical
method does not replace traditional legal analysis—the craft of discovering the
DNA of the law through experienced reading of persuasive sources,” and that
“this Restatement relies on case analysis that applies both methods.”49 In
addition to describing the results of the quantitative study of privacy policy
decisions, the Reporters’ Notes to section 1 include three more traditional
arguments for the proposed comment 9. In order to understand the importance
of the quantitative case law study, one needs to understand the limitations of the
Reporters’ more traditional arguments for the comment. The Draft’s readings of
what it identifies as leading cases also presages problems with the quantitative
study’s coding.
The Reporters’ first argument for comment 9 is surprisingly formalistic,
given that the Reporters’ academic work is so attuned to policy considerations.
This inclusive classification is justified as a matter of principle, since the rights in
information are at the core of many consumer products and services. Increasingly,
consumers “pay” for services by allowing businesses to collect personal
information, and it is therefore necessary to regard the personal-information
provisions as part of the contract.50

There are at least two difficulties with the above argument. First, although
the sale of consumer information is part of the business model of many
companies, few of those businesses advertise their services as a quid pro quo for
the consumer’s information. The use of the consumer’s information is not part
of a bargain in the traditional sense of the term—one that the consumer
understands. Second, the second sentence in the above passage is a non sequitur.
Even if the business’s use of consumer information were the price of services
provided, it would not automatically follow (“necessary to regard”) that the

48.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13. For more, see Chris Jay
Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61
UCLA L. REV. 606 (2014).
49.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Reporters’ Introduction at 6.
50.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13.
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business’s privacy policy is part of the contract. What becomes part of any
contract is a question of positive law, not logical deduction from metaphysical
principles of exchange. Here Cardozo gets it right: considerations of public
policy and reason should not be ignored to save the “symmetry of a concept.”51
The relevant question is whether consumers and businesses would benefit from
rules requiring clearer and more conspicuous notice and an affirmative act of
assent, not on how businesses currently pay for and profit from the services they
provide.
The Reporters’ Notes appeal to three cases as supporting the proposed
comment: Gwinnett Community Bank v. Arlington Capitol,52 which they identify
as “the one published state appellate case on this topic,”53 as well as In re JetBlue
Airways Corporation Privacy Litigation,54 and In re American Airlines Privacy
Litigation,55 two district court decisions whose reasoning the Notes characterize
as “compelling.”56
A look at the three decisions reveals that they provide little or no support
for the comment. Gwinnett concerned a business-to-business dispute. The only
contract issue in the case was a commercial borrowers’ counterclaim that the
lender committed breach by not adhering to its own privacy statement. The trial
court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss that claim. The Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed on the grounds that “[a] review of [the privacy] statement
shows that the statement applies only to consumer customers,” and the
commercial borrower was not a consumer.57 Nowhere in the decision does the
court state that the privacy statement created a contract with consumers. Nor did
it need to reach the issue to dismiss the commercial borrower’s claim of breach.
The Draft therefore mischaracterizes the Gwinnitt opinion when it states that “the
court found that privacy notices may give rise to contractual obligations.”58
The Reporters describe the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York’s decision in JetBlue as the “dominant precedent” for their position that
online privacy policies fall under the rules of the Draft Restatement.59 Although
the holding provides some support for the draft comment, that support is very
limited, and the court’s reasoning is sharply at odds with the Draft’s proposed
formation rules.
51.

Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 375

(1927).
52.
757 S.E.2d 239 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
53.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13.
54.
379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
55.
370 F. Supp. 2d 552 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
56.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14.
57.
757 S.E. at 247. See also Gwinnett Cmty. Bank v. Arlington Capital, LLC, 2013
WL 9541946, at *3 (Ga. Super. 2013) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract
claim).
58.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14.
59.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14; see also Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 29
(describing JetBlue as the “dominant case” based on citation counts). I discuss problems with the
Reporters’ use of citation counts in Section III.D.
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The relevant issue in JetBlue was the plaintiff’s claim that “JetBlue’s
published privacy policy constitutes a self-imposed contractual obligation by and
between the airline and the consumers with whom it transacted business.”60
JetBlue argued in its motion to dismiss that the policy did not create a contract,
as customers were able to purchase tickets online or by phone “without ever
viewing, reading, or relying on JetBlue’s website privacy statement.”61 Applying
the very deferential standard required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,62
the court found the pleadings sufficient to state a claim for breach, based on
plaintiffs’ allegation “that they and other class members relied on the
representations and assurances contained in the privacy policy when choosing to
purchase air transportation from JetBlue.”63 Because the court permitted the
claim to go forward, this study coded the decision as providing support for the
proposed comment.
Yet this was not the end of the opinion. The court emphasized that the
plaintiffs would be required to prove actual reliance on the privacy policy, a
factual question that would be addressed at the class certification stage.64 That
requirement is at odds with the formation rules in section 2 of the Draft
Restatement, which require only “reasonable notice . . . and an opportunity to
review.”65 In any case, the contract claim never reached class certification. The
court granted in the same decision the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim
on the separate ground that the plaintiffs had failed to allege injury.66 The
statement that the privacy policy might have been a term of the contract was
therefore unnecessary to the outcome, was never tested on the evidence, and
suggested a reliance requirement absent from the Draft Restatement’s own
formation rules. Although there is evidence that the court considered the contract
claim potentially viable, the decision as a whole does not support comment 9.
The third judicial decision that the Reporters’ Notes identify as a leading
authority is the district court’s published decision in In re American Airlines
Privacy Litigation. The decision does not appear on the table of decisions that
the Reporters provided the author, although a subsequent unpublished decision
in the same case does.67
The published decision in American Airlines does not support the proposed
comment. The relevant question was similar to that in JetBlue: the defendant

60.
379 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
61.
Id. at 325.
62.
Id. at 305-06 (“In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must
accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.”).
63.
Id. at 325.
64.
Id.
65.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 2(a).
66.
379 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27. A review of the case docket indicates that the plaintiff
did not amend its complaint and that the above decision effectively ended the case.
67.
In re Am. Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig., 2005 WL 3323028 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2005).
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airline’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that it had committed breach by
violating its own privacy policy. The only arguable evidence for the proposed
comment is a sentence in the summary of the plaintiffs’ complaint that
“American’s website sets out its privacy policy, which is part of the contract of
carriage with passengers.”68 But that statement is not a legal conclusion. The
proposition is assumed arguendo for the sake of deciding the motion to dismiss,
on the grounds that the court was required at that stage of the proceedings to
“accept[] as true all well-pleaded factual obligations, and draw[] all reasonable
inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.”69 Having granted the plaintiffs the benefit of that
doubt, the court proceeded in the same decision to dismiss the contract claim
based on their failure to plead injury.70
The third traditional argument one finds in the Reporters’ Notes addresses
an objection I suggested in the previous section. “The conclusion that privacy
notices are contracts does not preclude the application of specific rules arising
from privacy law. It suggests, however, that unless a clear overriding reason
exists, the general rules and principles of this Restatement ought to apply.”71 In
other words, applying the Draft’s relaxed requirements for contractual assent to
online privacy policies does not preclude legislative or perhaps regulatory action
in this area that might address the special concerns raised by data privacy.
This is, of course, true. But it is not a reason why courts should not take the
same considerations into account when determining how the common law of
contracts applies to privacy policies in consumer transactions. And it requires
only a passing familiarity with the Supreme Court’s recent Federal Arbitration
Act jurisprudence to understand how in our political and legal culture the rhetoric
of contract can be wielded to great effect in battles over consumer protection.72
The Draft Restatement’s treatment of online privacy policies as contract terms is
not inconsequential.
II.

Attempt to Reproduce the Draft’s Quantitative Results

The limitations on the Draft’s traditional legal arguments for comment 9
make it all the more important to understand the strength of the Reporters’
quantitative study. The Reporters state that they find between 2004 and 2015
fifty-one decisions, representing “all published and readily available
unpublished decisions involving claims for breach of contract for business
68.
370 F. Supp. at 556.
69.
Id. at 556, n.5.
70.
Id. at 567. The subsequent unpublished American Airlines decision, which appears
in the dataset of Reporters’ quantitative study, provides some support for the proposed comment 9, and
appears in this study’s count of cases recognizing that a privacy policy might become part of the contract.
But it too was on a motion to dismiss. Section IV.A.2 discusses the weakness of the authority provided
by such decisions.
71.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 16.
72.
See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 240-53 (2013) (Kagan,
J., dissenting); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 357-67 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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violations of privacy policies.”73 Based on their coding of those decisions, they
find that out of forty relevant decisions, in thirty-five “the court concluded that
privacy policies could give rise to contractual obligations,” whereas in only five
did the court “conclude that privacy notices are not contracts.”74 They also find
a “clear and increasing trend toward contractual enforcement of privacy
policies,” and, based on citation counts, that “cases embracing privacy notices as
contracts are not only more numerous, but more influential.”75 In addition to
including these results in the Draft Restatement, the Reporters published them in
the Winter 2017 issue of University of Chicago Law Review (the “Chicago
Article”).76
The Reporters have not yet published the data or coding from any of the
Draft Restatement’s six quantitative case law studies. In February 2017, I asked
them via email whether they would share the data from those studies. They
graciously sent a spreadsheet with the case citations and some of the coding from
their study of privacy policies.77 This Part reports the results of my attempt to
reproduce the Reporters’ findings using the dataset they provided. Section III.A
discusses this study’s methods. Section III.B describes the core results of my
independent coding of the decisions in the dataset. Section III.C analyzes the
Reporters’ claim of a trend toward enforcement in contract. Section III.D
evaluates the Reporters’ use of citation counts to identify leading decisions.
A. Coding Criteria
The Reporters provided a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet listing the fifty-one
decisions they used in their study of privacy policies. Although the Reporters
coded the decisions for features such as claim type (sword or shield), action type
(class or bilateral), and transaction type (services, sale of goods, etc.),78 the
spreadsheet they provided coded for only three variables: (1) number of out-ofstate citations, (2) out-of-state citations per year, and (3) whether the decision
recognized the privacy policy as part of the contract (“k_found”), did not
recognize it as part of the contract (“pp_not_a_contract”), or neither.
The Reporters did not provide and have not published a detailed description
of their procedures for coding cases. The Chicago Article indicates that research
assistants might have performed the coding.79 The Reporters have not said

73.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14. This study did not test the recall
of the Reporters’ search methods.
74.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15.
75.
Id.
76.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3.
77.
The Reporters declined to provide data or coding from the other studies described
in the Draft Restatement. The Reporters have provided data from the other studies to advisers and
members of a consultative group for the Draft Restatement project. See Adam Levitin et al., The Faulty
Foundation of the Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (2019).
78.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 20.
79.
Id. at 16 (describing case selection).
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whether coding was done blindly—whether coders were aware, for example, of
any working hypothesis with respect to privacy policies. Nor do they describe
external checks on coding—whether, for example, decisions were coded by more
than one reader, and if so the interrater reliability measure,80 or whether the
Reporters themselves checked or corrected any coding.
Because I wanted to explore the coding decisions as much as the results of
the coding, I did not use blind coding or multiple independent coders. A single
research assistant gathered the fifty-one decisions in the Reporters’ dataset and
did a first cut at coding.81 I then read and recoded those decisions. Both of us
were aware of the Reporters’ coding when reading the decisions. This Article
reports only my coding. The results might therefore be described as “law office
empiricism.” This study’s quantitative findings represent the judgment of a
single experienced academic lawyer. A check on those judgments can be found
in the parenthetical explanations in the footnotes in Section II.B, in the
qualitative discussion of representative cases in Section IV.B, in the Appendix,
which provides a summary of the coding of each case, and in the database
available online that contains the complete coding.82
Often when attempting to replicate another study, a researcher uses the
same coding procedures as in the original study. Neither the Draft Restatement
nor the Chicago Article, however, describes a rubric given to coders. There is,
however, also an advantage to attempting to reproduce results with
independently constructed coding criteria. As described in Section II.B, the Draft
makes several specific claims about the potential legal effects of a business’s
online privacy policy. Most significantly, the Draft states that “a notice that
purports to create consent-based rights and obligations should be viewed as the
subject matter of a consumer contract, in the same way that notices regarding the
scope of warranty, remedies, or dispute resolution do.”83 This entails under
sections 2 and 3 that such a notice can become part of the contract even if the
consumer does not affirmatively assent to it. Taking that claim at face value—as
voting members of the ALI must and as future users of the Restatement will—
and then constructing a coding rubric to test it is also a way to check the
Reporters’ findings. This approach seeks to find the support an experienced

80.
The idea is familiar in empirical psychology. For an excellent introduction, see
Steven E. Stemler, A Comparison of Consensus, Consistency, and Measurement Approaches in
Estimating Interrater Reliability, PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT, RESEARCH & EVALUATION (2004),
http://PAREonline.net/getvn.asp?v=9&n=4 [https://perma.cc/B2QH-3664]. For a discussion of how it can
be applied to the coding of cases, see Hall & Wright, supra note 18 at 112-16.
81.
The research assistant was a law student in the second semester of her first year at
Georgetown University Law Center. Consistent with the discussion in Part IV, the research assistant and
I disagreed on a significant number of coding decisions.
82.
Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer
Contract Law, GEO. L.: SCHOLARLY COMMONS, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1987/
[https://perma.cc/NR97-KL97] (under “Additional Files”). I am grateful to the Reporters for granting me
permission to publish both their list of cases and their coding alongside mine.
83.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 13.
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scholar in the field would expect for the core legal claim that the Reporters use
the quantitative study to bolster.
Coding the decisions in the dataset required both general criteria for
identifying a decision’s relevance, and in some instances case-specific
judgments about a decision’s meaning. This section discusses the generic coding
criteria the author used. Case-specific judgments are described in Section III.B.
Section IV.B describes in greater detail a representative sample of case-specific
judgments.
Some generic coding decisions concerned which cases to treat as relevant
to the question posed. The Reporters’ Notes state that their study found “51 cases
in which consumers brought breach-of-contract claims for violations of privacy
notices or in which firms, as defendants, sought to enforce their own policies,
arguing that they constitute contracts and that consumers’ assent to them
operates as a defense against the alleged privacy violations.”84 This study
therefore counted only cases that were between businesses and consumers and
in which one side or the other argued that a privacy policy was part of the
contract.
This study also counted only decisions relevant to whether privacy policies
are governed by the formation rules in the Draft Restatement’s sections 2 and 3.
As I have already observed, there is no question that parties can contract over
information generated during a transaction. There is a question, however, about
how a business can enter into such contracts with consumers, and particularly
whether the Draft Restatement’s formation rules apply to online privacy policies
to which the consumer has not expressly assented.85 The Reporters argue they
do. They therefore attach the following illustration to comment 9:
A consumer uses a business’s website to order a product. Before the purchase is
complete, the website refers the consumer to the Privacy Policy. The provisions
of this Restatement apply to . . . the Privacy Policy.86

Similarly, the Reporters’ Notes criticize the decision in In re Northwest
Airlines Privacy Litigation, which held that a browsewrap privacy policy did not
create a contract, as “inconsistent with the majority rule of what constitutes
contractual assent (see § 2 of the Restatement).”87 This study therefore counted
only those decisions in which the consumer did not expressly agree to the privacy

84.
Id., Reporters’ Notes at 14 (emphasis added).
85.
There is also a question about whether the rules apply to policies sent after a
transaction is complete—shrinkwrap—and to modifications of privacy policies. None of the decisions in
the dataset addressed those situations.
86.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, illus. 4.
87.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14; see In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 WL
1278459, at *6 (“[A]bsent an allegation that Plaintiffs actually read the privacy policy, not merely the
general allegation that Plaintiffs ‘relied on’ the policy, Plaintiffs have failed to allege an essential element
of a contract claim: that the alleged ‘offer’ was accepted by Plaintiffs.”).
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policy—in which the formation rules in the Draft section 2 would make a
difference to the outcome.
Another set of general coding decisions related to the strength of the
judicial statement. In an attempt to reproduce the Reporters’ results, this study
adopted a permissive rule—one that gave the Reporters’ coding every benefit of
the doubt.88 It did not, for example, attempt to distinguish between dicta and
holding. Any statement or holding in the decision that was relevant to the
question was counted, although holding always trumped dicta. Thus, if a court
permitted a contract claim to go forward, the decision was coded as supporting
the proposed comment, even if it included dicta suggesting elements such as
consumer reliance on the policy that were contrary to the rules in the Draft. Nor
did this study differentiate between statements that the privacy policy was a
contract term and statements that it might be a contract term. Either was coded
as supporting the proposed comment. Finally, no distinction was made between
bilateral and class actions, between pro se plaintiffs and plaintiffs represented by
counsel, or based on other factors that might have affected the outcome. In short,
when coding decisions, the author looked for any language or a holding that a
later court might cite as direct, if nonbinding, authority for either the proposition
that a separately provided privacy policy could be a contract term or that it could
not be one. Part IV discusses how these permissive coding rules affect the
authoritative and persuasive strength of the results.
This study therefore coded as supporting the proposed comment decisions
that (a) held that the business’s privacy policy was part of the contract,
(b) permitted to go forward a well-pled contract-based claim or defense based on
the privacy policy, or (c) stated that in the judge’s view the privacy policy might
be part of the contract. It coded as contrary authority decisions holding or stating
that the privacy policy was not enforceable in contract for reasons inconsistent
with sections 2 and 3 of the Draft. Like the Reporters, this study did not treat as
relevant rejections of a contract-based claim or defense for other reasons, such
as a failure to plead injury, or a finding that the behavior the consumer
complained of was not contrary to the policy.89 Such case-specific reasons do
not address the general enforceability of privacy policies under the rules
described in sections 2 and 3.
Like the Reporters, this study used a basic tripartite coding. Decisions in
the dataset that contained support for the proposition that a business’s posted
privacy policy could become part of the contract pursuant to the rules in sections
2 and 3 were coded as “contract.” Decisions that contained support for the

88.

Initial attempts at coding with a more restrictive rule resulted in many fewer relevant

decisions.
89.
See DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14-15 (explaining the Reporters’
decision not to count eleven cases in which the court “failed to find a valid claim for breach of contract
for reasons internal to contract claims, including failure of consideration or lack of mutuality, insufficient
notice to constitute mutual assent, and failure to ascertain damages for breach of contract”); Bar-Gill et
al., supra note 3, at 26 n.59 (discussing the importance of identifying the grounds of decisions).
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opposite position, that a business’s posted privacy policy does not become part
of its contract with the consumer, were coded as “no contract.” Decisions that
did not contain support for either proposition were coded as “irrelevant.”90
B. Judicial Decisions on Privacy Policies as Contracts
This study’s coding of the cases differs significantly from the Reporters’
coding. The disagreements go both ways. In some decisions that the Reporters
code as contract, I find that the court rejected the contract claim. In some
decisions that the Reporters code as no contract, I find a statement or holding
that the policy was or might have been a contract term. Overall, however, I find
significantly more decisions containing no relevant statement or holding than do
the Reporters. This study therefore both finds a smaller universe of relevant
decisions and, within that universe, disagrees with the Reporters on a number of
coding choices with respect to the fundamental question they sought to answer:
“Are online privacy notices that businesses post on their websites treated by
courts as contracts?”91
The reasons this study excludes decisions fall into three broad categories. I
find nine decisions to be entirely inapposite to the question posed. Examples
included cases that did not involve a dispute between a business and a consumer
(such as Gwinnett,92 described above in Section II.C), a decision that merely
repeated the law of the case from an earlier decision in the dataset, and decisions
that addressed terms of an end user license agreement or terms of service rather
than separate privacy policies. Seventeen decisions are excluded based on a
finding that the court said nothing, in either holding or dicta, about whether the
privacy policy at issue was or might be part of the contract. Finally, ten are
excluded because they are what the Reporters describe as “shield cases”—cases
in which the business invoked the privacy policy as a defense to a claimed noncontractual privacy violation. In these decisions courts did not ask whether or
not the privacy policy was part of the contract, but applied rules drawn from torts
and privacy law to determine whether consumers had effectively consented to
the use of their information. Of the remaining fifteen decisions, I find that eleven
arguably support the proposed comment (coded as “contract”) and that four are
contrary authority (coded as “no contract”).
These numerical results can be summarized and compared to those of the
Reporters in Table 1.

90.
This correlates with the Reporters’ coding of decisions “conclud[ing] that privacy
notices could give rise to contractual obligations,” decisions “concluding that privacy notices are not
contracts,” and decisions in which “the holding . . . did not turn on the classification of privacy notices as
contracts.” DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Reporters’ Notes at 14-15.
91.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 25.
92.
757 S.E.2d 239 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
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Table 1: Coding Comparisons
Author

Irrelevant
decisions in
dataset

Relevant
decisions in
dataset

Draft
Restatement

Inapposite

9

No statement or
holding

17

Shield

10

Support Draft
Comment

11

35

Do Not Support
Draft Comment

4

5

11

The remainder of this Section provides a more detailed description of the
individual coding decisions that generated the above numbers, and then discusses
what those numbers say about the empirical basis of comment 9. A summary of
each case’s coding appears in the Appendix. The reader can access additional
details of this study’s coding of individual cases in a Microsoft Excel file
available online.93
1. Inapposite Decisions
The Reporters provided a list of fifty-one decisions, all issued between
2004 and 2015. Of these, one state court decision has been “withdrawn from
publication at the direction of the court” and was excluded from this study’s
analysis.94 Four decisions in the original dataset concerned business-to-business
disputes, did not turn on the enforceability of a consumer contract, and so were

93.
See Klass, supra note 82.
94.
Daniels v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4510 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. July 22, 2011) (coded by Reporters as contract). The docket indicates that the opinion was withdrawn
on June 8, 2011, but does not indicate why. The opinion was found in a Bloomberg database. 2011 BL
243672. Had this study included the decision, it would have been coded as irrelevant. First, the opinion
states that Account Agreement being sued upon “contains a privacy policy,” suggesting that the policy
might not have been in a separate document. Second, and more importantly, the court dismissed the
consumer’s breach claim because the plaintiffs failed to point to a provision of the account agreement or
privacy policy that the defendant breached, and the defendant’s disclosures were pursuant to a magistrate’s
subpoena. The court therefore did not address on the motion to dismiss the policy’s enforceability.
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removed.95 The original dataset included two pairs of decisions that were
separate rulings in the same case. In one of these, the later decision did not issue
a new holding on the contract question but repeated the court’s earlier holding
as the law of the case.96 Given the relatively small size of the dataset, it seemed
appropriate to exclude the later decision from the count. Finally, three decisions
did not involve posted privacy policies or their analogs. Two of these concerned
a clause in an end user license agreement or terms of service, as distinguished
from a separate privacy policy, and required express consumer consent to those
terms.97 The third involved a written policy that the plaintiff signed at the
defendant’s place of business.98 Because in each of these three cases the
consumer affirmatively assented to the use of her information, the decisions do
not support the Draft’s suggestion that an online privacy policy can become part
of a consumer contract pursuant to section 2’s less demanding assent rules.
Removing these nine inapposite decisions leaves forty-two decisions.

95.
Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., 2013 WL 5568706, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013)
(plaintiff website operator argued defendant website operator violated browsewrap terms of service
related to use of site code; coded by Reporters as neither contract nor no contract); Olney v. Job.Com,
Inc., 2014 WL 4660851, at *1, *3-*6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (although case was originally brought by
consumer, order concerned the business defendant’s third-party complaint against another business;
motion to dismiss granted based on holdings that third-party defendant was agent not undisclosed
principal, and that browsewrap formation was insufficiently pled; coded by Reporters as neither contract
nor no contract); Meyer v. Christie, 2007 WL 3120695, at *1, *3-*5 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007) (plaintiff
was sophisticated real estate developer who sued lender; the complaint alleged contract based both on a
privacy policy and on an implied relational obligation; the court relied on the long-term relationship with
the bank to hold pleadings sufficient; coded by Reporters as contract); Gwinnett Cmty. Bank v. Arlington
Capital, LLC, 326 Ga. App. 710, 710, 720-21 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (plaintiff was lender to real estate
clients and borrowed $4 million from defendant; no statement or holding was issued on whether the
privacy policy would be enforceable for consumers, only that it did not apply to non-consumer party;
coded by Reporters as contract).
96.
In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2014 WL 1102660, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014)
(motion for class certification, following ruling on motion to dismiss, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 2013); coded by Reporters as contract).
The other follow-on decision, In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, 58 F. Supp. 3d
968 (N.D. Cal. 2014), issued a new ruling on the contract question for a subclass that had not been
considered in the earlier decision, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). This study coded the first
decision as containing no relevant statement or holding, see infra note 107, and the second as holding that
the privacy policy was a contract term.
97.
Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., 2012 WL 5471149, *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (pro se
plaintiff claimed breach of “Yahoo!’s Terms of Service statement, to which users are required to consent
in order to obtain a Yahoo! email account”; coded by Reporters as neither contract nor no contract);
Johnson v. Microsoft, 2009 WL 1794400, at *2-*5 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2009) (contract claims based
on End User License Agreement where “user must accept [EULA] terms to complete installation”; three
contract claims involved EULA only; one claim involved privacy statement expressly referenced in
EULA; coded by Reporters as contract); see also Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., 2013 WL 5568706, *1 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (excluded because dispute did not involve a consumer contract; plaintiff claimed breach
of browsewrap terms of service, not separate privacy policy).
98.
Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv. Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 710, 713 (E.D. La. 2009)
(plaintiff signed privacy policy at tax preparer’s office; contract claim dismissed for failure to plead
cognizable injury; coded by Reporters as contract).
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2. Decisions with No Relevant Statement or Holding
I believe all of the above judgments are relatively straightforward. This
study’s further paring of the dataset relied on coding decisions having to do with
the reasoning in the decisions. Section IV.B describes in greater detail a
representative sample of disagreements with the Reporters’ coding and their
causes.
Of the remaining forty-two decisions, and bracketing the shield decisions
discussed in the next section, this study found that seventeen did not contain a
statement or holding one way or the other on whether the privacy policy might
be part of the contract. The Reporters’ coding agrees for six of those seventeen
decisions. In addition, the Reporters coded two decisions as neither contract nor
no contract that this study coded as one or the other. The Reporters therefore
coded a total of eight decisions in the pared dataset of forty-two as neither
contract nor no contract, compared to this study’s seventeen.
The reasons this study coded these decisions as irrelevant varied. Two
decisions dismissed a breach of contract claim based on a failure to plead injury
without discussing whether the privacy policy was part of the contract, one
expressly declining to do so.99 Another relied on the plaintiff’s failure to plead
injury to conclude that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing.100 One decision
dismissed the complaint based on failure to plead consideration or breach.101
Another addressed a case in which an integrated online membership agreement

99.
Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028-29 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (breach
claim dismissed based on failure to plead injury; coded by Reporters as neither contract nor no contract);
Trikas v. Universal Card Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 37, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (pro se plaintiff; expressly
declining to rule on whether privacy policy was a contract term, but quoting Dyer on statements of policy
not constituting contracts; coded by Reporters as neither contract nor no contract); see also Rudgayzer v.
Yahoo! Inc., 2012 WL 5471149, at *6-*7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (excluded because suit was for breach
of clickwrap terms of service, not privacy policy; contract claim dismissed for failure to plead injury;
coded by Reporters as neither contract nor no contract); Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv. Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 2d 710, 717-19 (E.D. La. 2009) (excluded because the plaintiff signed the privacy policy; breach
of contract claim dismissed for failure to plead cognizable injury; coded by Reporters as contract).
As noted above, the Reporters agree that decisions based on failure to plead injury should
not be included. See supra note 89. In the Chicago Article, however, they state that these cases turned on
the “inability to ascertain damages,” and argue that “the willingness of courts to address issues internal to
contract enforcement—such as the measure of damages for breach—provides further evidence for the
rejection of the original Dyer case” (which held that a privacy policy was not a contract term). Bar-Gill et
al., supra note 3, at 28. This is a mistake. These cases are not about the certainty rule or the measure of
damages. All were decided on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to plead cognizable injury.
These decisions are simply examples of courts dismissing the case on one ground when others were
perhaps available. In none did the court investigate the measure of damages or their ascertainability. See
also DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15 (“Note, however, that even in these eleven cases
[that the Reporters did not count], courts applied contract-law doctrines to evaluate whether the privacy
notices created enforceable obligations.”).
100.
Carlsen v. GameStop Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 855, 866 (D. Minn. 2015) (pro se
plaintiff; coded by Reporters as neither contract nor no contract).
101.
London v. New Albertson’s, Inc., 2008 WL 4492642, at *5-*6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2008) (coded by Reporters as neither contract nor no contract); see Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 26 n.59
(stating that judicial doubts about whether a privacy policy is supported by consideration are not salient
to the Reporters’ question).
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expressly provided that the privacy policy was not enforceable, causing the
plaintiff to withdraw its claim for breach.102 Yet another was decided on a
collection of several of the above non-relevant reasons, again without addressing
whether the consumer assented to the policy.103 Five decisions concerned the
scope of either an arbitration or a forum selection clause that was not in the
privacy policy, although there were privacy-related claims. None of those five
decisions addressed the legal effect of the privacy policy, much less whether it
was a contract term.104 In three other decisions the plaintiff did not attempt to
enforce the privacy policy in contract and the defendant did not invoke it as a
defense against a privacy claim.105 And three decisions were reached based on
evidentiary deficiencies or mispleading of claims, again without addressing
whether the privacy policy was enforceable in contract.106 Removing these
seventeen decisions leaves twenty-five decisions from the Reporters’ original
dataset.107
102.
Freedman v. America Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 640, 643 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(pro se plaintiff; coded by Reporters as contract).
103.
Austin-Spearman v. AARP Servs., 113 F. Supp. 3d 130, 139-43 (D.D.C. 2015)
(holding that because defendant’s actions were permitted by the privacy policy, the plaintiff suffered no
injury, and that because there was no notice of the privacy policy prior to the consumers’ assent to a
membership agreement, the policy was not part of that agreement; coded by Reporters as no contract).
104.
Bassett v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36175, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,
2015) (arbitration clause in clickwrap terms of service, not in privacy policy; coded by Reporters as
contract); Mendoza v. Microsoft, 1 F. Supp. 3d 533, 548 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (choice-of-venue clause in
terms of use covered alleged privacy violations described in privacy policy; motion to dismiss for
improper venue granted; coded by Reporters as contract); Hodson v. Bright House Networks, LLC, 2013
WL 1499486, at *1-*2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2013) (contract arbitration clause not narrowed by privacy
policy, incorporated by reference, indicating consumers “may” bring Cable Communications Policy Act
claims in district court; coded by Reporters as contract); Hodson v. DirecTV, LLC, 2012 WL 5464615, at
*3-*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2012) (scope of arbitration clause in satellite television customer agreement;
review of complaint shows no breach of contract claim based on privacy policy; coded by Reporters as
contract); Greer v. 1-800 Flowers.com, 2007 WL 3102178, at *2-*3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2007) (scope of
choice of venue clause in terms of use, where privacy policy sued upon provided that it was subject to
terms of use; coded by Reporters as contract).
105.
Padilla v. Dish Network L.L.C., 2013 WL 3791140, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013)
(plaintiff’s implied contract claim withdrawn after defendant argued contrary terms in privacy policy; no
leave to replead for violations of privacy policy, as no injury; coded by Reporters as neither contract nor
no contract); Burton v. Time Warner Cable, 2012 WL 1415471, at *4-*5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013)
(plaintiff’s implied contract claim withdrawn after defendant argued contrary terms in privacy policy;
leave to re-plead violation of privacy policy; court declined to address “the potentially amended express
contract claim, until that claim is properly before the Court”; coded by Reporters as contract); Browning
v. AT&T Corp., 682 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (claims of privacy torts, violation of Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act, and other statutory violations; coded by Reporters as contract).
106.
In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp.
2d 942, 979 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (breach of warranty claims subject to California law; plaintiffs did not
address defendant’s argument that they failed as a matter of California law; no leave to re-plead; coded
by Reporters as contract); Lucky v. Ky. Bank (In re Lucky), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5734, at *23-*24 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2011) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment where plaintiff did not
provide evidence that privacy policy was in place, or indicate what terms were breached; coded by
Reporters as no contract); Lee v. Picture People, Inc., 2012 WL 1415471, at *4 (Del. Sup. Ct. Mar. 19,
2012) (court rejected breach of warranty claim based on privacy policy since policy did not relate to the
quality of the goods; coded by Reporters as neither contract nor no contract).
107.
A portion of one other case was coded as irrelevant at this stage. In re Google Inc.,
Privacy Policy Litigation, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013), involved both the plaintiff’s claim
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3. Shield Decisions
Like the Reporters, this study coded for whether the privacy policy was
being used as a sword or as a shield. Sword cases in this context are those in
which the plaintiff consumer claimed breach of contract based on the business’s
violation of its privacy policy. In other words, they are cases in which the
plaintiff’s argument relied on the policy being part of the contract. Shield cases
are those in which the defendant business invoked the policy as a defense against
a claim of statutory or common law privacy violations.
Although the dataset that the Reporters provided did not include
sword/shield coding, the Chicago Article reports in the entire dataset twenty-four
sword decisions, twenty-two shield decisions, and five “Consent for Statutory
Liability” decisions.108 This study independently coded for sword or shield. In
the entire dataset, it found thirty-one sword decisions, ten shield decisions, two
decisions that included both sword and shield claims, and eight decisions that
were not classifiable as either sword or shield. Of the twenty-five decisions that
remain after the above paring, this study coded fourteen as sword, ten as shield,
and one as including both types of claims.109
The Reporters included both sword and shield decisions in their published
results. This was significant. Of the eleven shield decisions (as coded by this
study) in the pared dataset, the Reporters coded ten as recognizing the privacy
policy as a contract term.110 This study’s coding agreed for all ten of those
decisions that the privacy policy effectively shielded the defendant from a noncontractual privacy claim. These results, together with those described in the next
subsection, suggest that, in the decisions in the dataset, invoking a privacy policy
as a shield was significantly more likely to succeed than invoking it as a sword.
of breach of contract based on the privacy policy and the defendant’s claim that the policy shielded them
against separate privacy-based claims. The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim of breach after finding that
the policy expressly permitted the actions at issue. Id. at *13-*14. It therefore did not need to reach, and
did not express an opinion on, the question of whether the policy was enforceable in contract. The
defendant’s invocation of the privacy policy as a defense appears in this study’s shield count.
108.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 27.
109.
Cain v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 136 F. Supp. 3d 824 (E.D. Mich. 2015);
Garcia v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2015); In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7
F.Supp.3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
Toney v. Quality Resources, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 727 (N.D. Ill. 2014); In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litig. (1),
2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013); In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig. (1), 2013 WL
6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., 2011 WL 1842859 (D. Mont. May 16,
2011); Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2011 WL 6325910 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011); Dunbar v.
Google, Inc., 2011 WL 12907501 (E.D. Tex. May 23, 2011); Mortensen v. Bresnan Communication,
L.L.C., 2010 WL 5140454 (D. Mont. Dec. 13, 2010).
Two of the above decisions were coded as both sword and shield. With respect to In re
Google Inc., Privacy Policy Litigation, this study found no holding or other statement on the sword claim.
See supra note 107. Cain v. Redbox appears both in the count of shield cases and in the count of no contract
cases, as the court held on summary judgment that only portions of the privacy policy expressly referenced
in the clickwrap terms of use were part of the contract. See infra note 123.
110.
The Reporters coded Toney v. Quality Resources, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 727 (N.D.
Ill. 2014), as neither contract nor no contract, despite the fact that the court rejected the shield defense.
See id. at 738-39.
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The question is whether these shield decisions should be counted as treating
the privacy policy as a term of the contract. The Chicago Article addresses the
fact that the ALI’s Draft Principles of the Law, Data Privacy “articulates sui
generis consent and ‘heightened notice’ rules, not founded in general contract
law doctrine.”111 And it states that the Reporters’ study “asked whether courts
enforce privacy practices as contracts.”112 Neither the Chicago Article nor the
Draft Restatement, however, explains how the Reporters distinguished
enforcement of the privacy policy in contract from uses of the policy to satisfy
non-contractual consent rules belonging to privacy law.
The shield cases (as coded by this study) include statutory claims based on
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“Wiretap Act”),113 the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act,114 the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,115 the Stored
Communications Act,116 Michigan’s Video Rental Privacy Act,117 and the
California Invasion of Privacy Act,118 as well as common law claims of invasion
of privacy, trespass to chattels, and violations of the right to publicity.119 As
Section IV.B.2 discusses in greater detail, in none of these decisions did the court
rely on the existence of a contract or contract doctrine to determine whether the
privacy policy provided a defense to the non-contractual privacy claim. Instead
those decisions applied rules governing consent or reasonable expectations
drawn from the relevant statute or common law action, or from tort law
generally.
Because of the different legal rules being applied and their different legal
effects, this study coded the shield decisions as irrelevant. Put simply, they are
not decisions “in which firms, defendants, sought to enforce their own policies,
arguing that they constitute contracts . . . “120 This means removing the eleven
remaining decisions or partial decisions coded as shield.121 That final paring
leaves a dataset of fifteen cases in which there is a statement or holding on the
question posed.

111.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 25.
112.
Id. at 26.
113.
18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2018).
114.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2018).
115.
47 U.S.C. § 227(b), (c) (2018).
116.
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2018).
117.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1711 et seq. (2018).
118.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.6 (West 2018).
119.
The privacy claims relevant to each of the shield cases can be found in this study’s
coded results, which are available online. See supra note 82.
120.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14.
121.
See supra note 107 for complications with a case that involved both sword and
shield claims.
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4. Remaining Decisions
The Reporters do not address the size of their dataset, or whether forty
decisions over the course of twelve years is a large enough number to draw robust
conclusions, whether about what the law is or about how courts are likely to
decide future cases. Reducing the number to fifteen decisions in twelve years—
the result of the above paring—makes the question even more pressing. We
simply might not have enough decisions to predict what future courts will do,
much less to infer what rules courts apply when asked to determine whether a
privacy policy is a standard term in a consumer contract.
With those caveats, it is still worth noting that this study’s coding generated
result substantially different from those of the Reporters. Of the fifteen relevant
decisions, this study found support for the proposed comment in eleven122 and
negative authority in four.123 Based on their coding, the Reporters conclude that
“courts are seven times more likely to recognize privacy policies as contracts
than they are not to recognize them as contracts (thirty-five cases versus five
cases).”124 This study’s coding, on the contrary, found in a smaller number of
relevant decisions that courts were a little less than three times as likely to find a
contract (eleven cases versus four cases).
The accuracy of any quantitative empirical study depends both on the size
of the sample and the magnitude of the observed effect.125 A smaller sample
reduces the likelihood that the findings reflect underlying phenomena, as does a
smaller observed effect. One way to see the difference between the strength of
this study’s results and that of the Reporters is by calculating the confidence
intervals for each.126 In a study that uses inferential statistics to predict, for
122.
Svenson v. Google Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43902 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015)
(coded by Reporters as contract); Owens v. Dixie Motor Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59006 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 31, 2014); Yunker v. Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30829 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (coded by
Reporters as contract); In re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 58 F. Supp. 3d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (coded
by Reporters as contract); Claridge v. RockYou, 785 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (coded by
Reporters as contract); Azeltine v. Bank of Am., 2010 WL 6511710 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2010) (coded by
Reporters as neither contract nor no contract); In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (S.D.
Cal. 2010) (coded by Reporters as contract); Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions,
Inc., 2010 WL 1799456 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (coded by Reporters as contract); Loeffler v. Ritz-Carlton
Hotel Co., 2006 WL 1796008 (D. Nev. Jun. 28, 2006) (coded by Reporters as contract); In re Am. Airlines,
Inc. Privacy Litig., 2005 WL 3323028 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2005) (coded by Reporters as contract); In re
JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (coded by Reporters as
contract).
123.
Cain v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 136 F. Supp. 3d 824 (E.D. Mich. 2015)
(under Illinois law, only portions of privacy policy expressly mentioned in clickwrap terms of use were
part of contract; coded by Reporters as contract); Starkey v. Staples, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186592
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 2013) (coded by Reporters as no contract); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp.
2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004) (coded by Reporters as no contract); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 WL
1278459 (D. Minn. Jun. 6, 2004) (coded by Reporters as no contract).
124.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 28.
125.
See John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2
PLOS MED. 696, 697 (2005).
126.
I am grateful to my colleagues Neil Sukhatme and Joshua Teitelbaum for helping
me with the statistical analysis in this and the next paragraph.
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example, the future probability P of outcome O based on past outcomes, a 95%
confidence interval with lower bound of A and upper bound of B means that,
given the study’s sample size and the outcomes observed, there is a 95% chance
that P’s true value lies somewhere between A and B. There are several methods
for calculating confidence intervals. Whereas normal, or Wald, approximation
intervals work well for large sample sizes, other methods are more appropriate
when a study is testing for ratios in a smaller sample.127 Four methods for
identifying the 95% confidence interval provide the following results for each
study:
Table 2: 95% Confidence Intervals

Wald approximation intervals
(“normal” intervals)
Wilson score intervals
Agresti-Coull intervals
Clopper-Pearson intervals
(“exact” method)

lower bound
upper bound
lower bound
upper bound
lower bound
upper bound
lower bound
upper bound

Draft’s
Coding
(7:1, n=40)
0.773
0.977
0.739
0.945
0.732
0.958
0.732
0.950

Author’s
Coding
(11:4, n=15)
0.510
0.957
0.484
0.891
0.449
0.922
0.476
0.895

These confidence intervals can be represented graphically as follows.
Figure 1

127.
See Lawrence D. Brown, T. Tony Cai & Anirban DasGupta, Interval Estimation
for a Binomial Proportion, 16 STAT. SCI. 101 (2001); Måns Thulin, The Cost of Using Exact Confidence
Intervals for a Binomial Proportion, 8 ELECTRONIC J. OF STAT. 817 (2014).
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The light area in each bar represents the 95% confidence interval. The top
bar for each method provides the confidence interval based on the Reporters’
coding, the bottom the confidence interval based on this study’s coding.
There are two things to notice about the above numbers and figure. First,
as one would expect, as the size of the sample and magnitude of the effect go
down, so too does a study’s accuracy. The Reporters’ coding of forty decisions
and finding of a 7:1 ratio provide a 95% confidence interval of approximately
0.2 under each method. According to the Reporters’ coding, there is a 95% level
of confidence that the actual likelihood that a future court will recognize a
privacy policy as a contract is somewhere between roughly 75% and 95%. This
study’s conclusion that there were in fact only 15 relevant decisions that
produced a 11:4 ratio results in a 95% confidence intervals of somewhat more
than 0.4, with lower and upper bounds of around 50% and 90%. If this study’s
coding is correct, the cases the Reporters found tell us much less about the actual
likelihood that a future court will recognize a privacy policy as a contract—only
that it lies somewhere between around fifty percent and around ninety percent.
Second, under all three of the preferred methods, this study finds that the
lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is below 0.5, and under the Wald
method the lower bound is only slightly higher than 0.5. This means that under
the preferred methods, this study cannot reject the null hypothesis. Based on this
study’s coding of the data, one cannot say with 95% certainty even that it is more
likely than not that a future court will recognize a business’s privacy policy as
part of the contract.128
All that said, there nothing magical about a probability greater than 0.5.
Although lawyers and courts regularly speak of “majority rules,” the concept is
rarely given a precise numerical meaning. Thus, a finding that 51% of courts
adopt one rule and 49% another might reasonably be described, for purposes of
determining what the law is, as a split with no clear majority. The important
question—both for the ALI members who might be asked to vote on a proposed
draft and for future users of a Restatement—is not what the majority of courts
have held, but the strength of judicial support for one or another rule. That
question is not binary, but scalar. It depends both on the ratio of the decisions
coming out each way and on the number of decisions on the question. The above
quantitative results suggest that the Reporters’ coding significantly overstates the
degree of support for their proposed rule. Part IV’s qualitative analysis argues in
addition that the decisions coded as contract have little authoritative or
persuasive value.
A Reporter for the Principles of the Law, Data Privacy has recently
observed that “contract proves largely irrelevant to information privacy law in
the United States. There are relatively few cases involving this doctrine, and

128.
Also relevant is that each method produces an upper bound for this study’s coding
below that of the Reporters’ coding. Even with its wider confidence interval, this study was unable to
confirm the upper bound of the Reporters’ results.
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these show a divide between courts that view privacy notices as possible
contracts and those that see them only as nonbinding expressions of
preferences.”129 The study’s results confirm that characterization of the case law.
C. Trends
In addition to counting judicial decisions, the Reporters examined their
coded data for trends over time. Perhaps because of the relatively small number
of decisions, rather than plotting the number of decisions of each type for each
year, the Reporters plotted the change in the cumulative number of decisions.
This produces the following graph, which appears both in the Draft’s Reporters’
Notes and in the Chicago Article.130
Figure 2

The Reporters argue that “[t]he graph shows the clear and increasing trend
towards contractual enforcement of privacy policies.”131
Adding the results from this study’s coding provides a somewhat different
picture of trends over time, keeping in mind that the smaller the relevant number
129.
Paul Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO.
L.J. 115, 151 (2017).
130.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15; Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at
29.
131.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15; see also Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 28 (“The
evolution of the case law over time shows a drift away from the Dyer position.”).
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of cases, the less reliable any conclusions drawn from them. Omitting the
category of cases that the Reporters coded as neither contract nor no contract
(“PP Not Recognized (Other)” in Figure Two) and combining the data from the
two studies produces the following comparison graph:
Figure 3

The darker lines represent the counts from this study’s coding, the lighter
lines the counts from the Draft Restatement’s coding. In both studies there is an
increase over time in the difference between the cumulative number of decisions
stating that the privacy policy could be a contract term and the number stating
that it was not, as one would expect given the final numbers in each study. But
the rate of increase is much less significant using this study’s coding. It is also
worth noting that the lines representing the no-contract decisions in the two
studies largely overlap. The difference between the studies’ results lies almost
entirely in the different number of decisions coded by each as suggesting that the
privacy policy could be a contract term. And in fact, of the thirty-six decisions
this study excluded from consideration for one reason or another, the Reporters
coded twenty-four as recognizing a privacy policy as a contract term.
One might also question the Reporters’ decision to present their results in
the above form, and particularly to graph cumulative numbers of decisions. The
Reporters perhaps chose to focus on the cumulative number because there are
relatively few decisions each year. A bar chart of the number of decisions of each
type each year, using either the Reporters’ coding or this study’s, does not
78
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suggest to the eye any obvious trends. But choosing to graph the cumulative
number of decisions risks misleading some readers. A casual reader might not
realize that a decision from 2004 appears twelve times in the graph—once in the
year handed down, and again in every subsequent year as part of the cumulative
count. To the reader who does not think mathematically or who is not paying
close attention, it might look like the number of decisions per year has increased
dramatically over time. It has not, although the cumulative number of decisions
naturally has. As importantly, though more subtly, what is significant in Figures
2 and 3 is not the growing delta between the cumulative numbers of contract and
of no-contract decisions, but the relative changes in the slope of each line over
time—or what is equivalent, the change in the ratio of contract to no-contract
decisions over time. The trend question is not whether there are ever more
holdings that a privacy policy is a term in the contract, but whether it is becoming
more likely that a privacy policy will be treated as a term.132
One can approach this question by plotting the ratios between the number
of each type of decision. Using the Reporters’ decision to use cumulative counts,
this produces the following graph:
Figure 4

According to the Reporters’ coding, the ratio of cumulative contract to nocontract decisions increases rapidly between 2004 and 2010, growing from 1:2

132.
If the distinction is not obvious, consider this: Every year sees a growing
difference, or delta, between the cumulative number of weekdays since year one and the cumulative
number of weekend days since that date. But the ratio of weekdays to weekend days has remained fairly
constant. Any given day is no more likely to be a weekday in the year 2019 than it was in the year nine.
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to 6:1. The rate of increase is much less dramatic between 2010 and 2015, first
decreasing a bit then increasing back to 7:1. Using this study’s coding, the
change over time is considerably smaller. Beginning with zero contract cases in
2004, we arrive in 2010 at a ratio of 3:1, which by 2015 has drifted down to
2.75:1.
An even more telling way to analyze the data is to look not at cumulative
decisions, but discrete time slices. Because the total number of decisions is
relatively low, yearly ratios do not tell us much. But taking five-year running
averages—the ratio of contract to no contract decisions during multiple five-year
periods—provides a very different picture.
Figure 5

The labels on the horizontal axis in Figure 5 are the last year of each fiveyear period. The gaps in the lines reflect that fact that in the Reporters’ coding
there were two five-year periods (2005-2009 and 2006-2010) in which there
were zero no-contract decisions, and in this study’s coding there were four such
periods (running between 2005 and 2012). The longer gap for this study is
attributable to the exclusion of many more decisions as not relevant to the
question.
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Figure 5 belies the Reporters’ statement that there is a “clear and increasing
trend towards contractual enforcement of privacy policies.”133 Instead it shows
that according to the Reporters’ coding there has not been a net increase in the
ratio of contract to no-contract decisions from around 2011 until 2015, or
according to this study’s coding between 2013 and 2015. In fact, the Reporters’
study finds a decline in the ratio of contract to no-contract decisions over the last
five years of the study period.
There is one additional factor to consider when thinking about the Draft’s
identification of trends. As noted above, the Reporters coded twenty-two of the
original fifty-one decisions as shield cases. This study coded twelve decisions in
the original dataset as shield cases, one of which was removed from the analysis
because it reported an earlier holding in the same case. But as I noted above and
will discuss at greater length in Section IV.B.2, if the question is “whether
privacy policies posted by businesses . . . are contracts,”134 there are good
reasons to exclude the shield decisions from the analysis.
Because the Reporters did not provide their sword/shield coding, it is
impossible to know with certainty the effect of including the shield decisions on
the trends they observed. The Author does not know which decisions the
Reporters coded as shield decisions, or how they pair up with their coding of
contract, no contract, or neither. It is significant, however, that out of the twelve
decisions in the complete dataset that this study codes as shield, the Reporters
coded eleven as recognizing the privacy policy as a contract. This suggests that
shield decisions might be significantly more likely to be coded in the Draft
Restatement’s analysis as contract than as no contract. As important, all twelve
of the decisions this study codes as shield were decided between 2010 and
2015.135 The timing is not surprising. Questions about data security and privacy
have achieved increased salience in recent years, meaning more plaintiffs
claiming non-contractual privacy violations and more opportunities for
defendants to invoke their privacy policies as defenses. Taken together, these
observations suggest that the Reporters’ choice to include the shield decisions
might have affected not only their analysis of the likelihood that a court will find
a privacy policy to be part of the contract, but also their observations of trends
over time. The increase in the ratio of contract to no-contract decisions that the
Reporters observe might be, in whole or in part, an artifact of their decision to
code shield decisions as supporting comment 9.

133.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15 (emphasis added).
134.
Id.
135.
One decision in 2010; two decisions in 2011, three decisions in 2012; two
decisions in 2013; four decisions in 2014; two decisions in 2015. One of these decisions was removed
from this study’s dataset not because it was a shield case, but because it repeated the holding of an earlier
decision in the same case also in the dataset.
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D. Citation Counts
In addition to looking at the ratio of contract to no-contract decisions and
trends over time, the Reporters examined out-of-state citation counts, on the
theory that “[w]hen such discretionary references are made, it is likely that the
citing court found the cited cases helpful when internal precedent was unclear or
missing.”136 Because there is an eleven-year gap between the earliest and latest
cases in the dataset, a comparison of the total number of citations is not telling.
The Reporters therefore used average citations per year as a measure of
influence.137 They also recognize that citation counts can be noisy, as not all
cases are cited positively or for the relevant holding. The Chicago Article states
that they “addressed the problem of over-inclusiveness by using an alternative,
narrower measure of influence, which counts only those cases that have been
followed by other courts.”138
Both the Draft Restatement and the Chicago Article use citation counts to
identify leading privacy policy decisions.139 Although the Chicago Article
appears to recognize the advantages of counting only citing cases that follow the
relevant holding, both the Draft and the Chicago Article studies rely on total
citation counts. The Chicago Article states that “[c]ases recognizing privacy
policies as contracts are more likely to get cited out of state,” and that this
supports the conclusion that “[a]fter 2005 . . . courts have predominantly
recognized privacy policies as contracts.”140 The Draft similarly reports that the
“analysis of citations indicates that cases embracing privacy notices as contracts
are not only more numerous, but more influential.”141
This study examined the citations to the fifty-one decisions in the
Reporters’ dataset, coding them inter alia for the holding that the decision was
cited for and how Westlaw classified the citation.142 The coding was performed

136.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 17. As noted in Section IV.A.1 below, the majority
of decisions in the Reporters’ dataset are from federal district and bankruptcy courts. These decisions are
not binding on other courts, including federal courts in the same jurisdiction. Unlike citations to a federal
appellate or some state court decision, a citation to a federal trial court is always discretionary. For an
apples-to-apples comparison, however, this study sticks to the Reporters’ method and focuses on out-ofstate citations.
137.
The Reporters do not address the fact that the number of annual citations to
decisions commonly declines over time and that fewer years since the decision provides a smaller sample.
Both reduce the likelihood that an average annual citation count of a recent decision accurately predicts
that decision’s eventual influence. A relatively high average annual citation count for a recent case should
therefore be taken with a grain of salt.
138.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 18.
139.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14-15; Bar-Gill et al., supra note
3, at 29.
140.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 28-29.
141.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15.
142.
Westlaw uses eight classifications: “cited by,” “mentioned by,” “discussed by,”
“examined,” “distinguished by (negative),” or “declined to follow by (negative),” “declined to extend by
(negative),” and “disagreed with (negative).” Because of the larger number of cases and the time it would
take to ensure completeness, this study did not exclude multiple decisions in a single case.
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by the research assistant who had coded the cases in the original dataset.
Citations were searched through June 2017.
Based on average citations per year, the Reporters identify the top three
decisions recognizing privacy policies as contract terms to be In re JetBlue
Airways143 (2005, 39 citations in the Reporters’ period, 4 per year), In re Sony
Gaming Networks144 (2014, 5 citations, 3 per year), and Perkins v. LinkedIn145
(2014, 3 citations, 2 per year).146 This Article’s study coded the latter two
decisions as irrelevant. The court in In re Sony Gaming dismissed the plaintiffs’
breach of express warranty claim without leave to re-plead based on a choice-oflaw analysis, never addressing the question of the policy’s enforceability.147
Perkins v. LinkedIn is a shield case in which the court did not find that the privacy
policy was part of the contract, but applied consent rules drawn from the Wiretap
Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the common law right of publicity.
Pertinent sections of the Perkins opinion are quoted at length in Section IV.B.2
below. I discuss the holding and reasoning of JetBlue above, in Section II.C. The
Reporters identify as the two leading no-contract decisions Dyer v. Northwest
Airlines148 (2004, 16 citations, 1 per year) and In re Northwest Airlines149 (2004,
10 citations, 1 per year).150 This study coded both as sword cases and, like the
Reporters, as no contract.
Although the total per-year citation counts appear to tell a compelling story,
the narrative loses its power upon inspection. As one would expect given their
holdings, none of the citations either to In re Sony Gaming or to Perkins v.
LinkedIn are for the proposition that a privacy policy might be a contract term.
During the period this study examined, only one decision citing Perkins did so
for its lengthy non-contractual analysis of when a privacy policy shields a
defendant from liability—the only section of the opinion even arguably relevant

143.
In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
144.
In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp.
2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
145.
Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
146.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 16.
147.
The plaintiffs brought breach of implied and express warranty claims under
Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Texas law. 996 F. Supp.2d 942, 976
(S.D. Cal. 2014). It is unclear from the opinion whether the plaintiffs founded their express warranty
claims on the privacy policy. In any case, the court dismissed all seven counts based on choice-of-law
clauses in the user agreements that specified California law. Because the plaintiffs did not address the
defendant’s argument that California express warranty claims would fail as a matter of law, the court did
not grant leave to amend. Id. at 979. The court did, however, hold that the plaintiff’s implied warranty
claims were precluded by disclaimers in the clickwrap user agreement and privacy policy. Id. at 980-83
(noting inter alia that “each Plaintiff was required to consent to the PSN User Agreement and the PSN
Privacy Policy”). And the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their state UDAP statutes claims.
Id. at 985-1009.
148.
Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004).
149.
In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004).
150.
The discussion of citation counts in the Reporters’ Notes mentions only Dyer.
Draft Restatement § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 16.
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to the question.151 And although the forty-four citations to JetBlue during this
study’s period might make it appear to be a leading decision, only two are for
the court’s statement that the privacy policy was part of the contract, both of
which Westlaw classified as “cited by.”152 Fourteen citations, in distinction, are
for the holding that the plaintiff’s failure to plead injury warranted dismissal of
the contract claim.
Citations to Dyer v. Northwest Airlines and to In re Northwest Airlines—
the two leading no-contract decisions—more often address the Reporters’
question. Of the twenty-two out-of-state decisions that cite Dyer, ten are for its
holding that the privacy policy was not part of the contract.153 Of these, Westlaw
classifies six as citing, one as mentioning, two as distinguishing and one as
declining to follow. In re Northwest Airlines was cited by twelve out-of-state
courts. Four citations are to its holding that the policy was not a contract term,
with Westlaw classifying one as citing, one as mentioning, one as distinguishing,
and one as declining to follow.154
In short, the Reporters’ use of total citation counts paints a misleading
picture of influence. The three decisions the Reporters identify as the “dominant
precedent”155 for treating privacy policies as part of the contract are, by the most
generous standards, together cited only three times for that proposition.156 The
two dominant decisions holding that the privacy policy was not a standard term
together generated fourteen relevant citations, both positive and negative. The
Reporters state that their “analysis of citations indicates that cases embracing
privacy notices as contracts are not only more numerous, but more
influential.”157 Their data do not support that conclusion.

151.
Gridiron Mgmt. Group LLC v. Pimmel, 2014 WL 3490958, at *2 (D. Neb. Jul. 11,
2014) (classified by Westlaw as “cited by”).
152.
Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards In Electronic Transactions, Inc., 2010 WL
1799456 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (classified by Westlaw as “cited by”); Meyer v. Christie, 2007 WL
3120695 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007) (same).
153.
Dolmage v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 2016 WL 754731, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23,
2016); Jianjun Fu v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 2014 WL 4681543, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2014);
Mireskandari v. Daily Mail and Gen. Trust PLC, 2013 WL 12114762, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013)
(special motion to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint); Mireskandari v. Mail, 2013 WL 12129559 (C.D.
Cal. Jul. 30, 2013) (motion to dismiss); Willingham v. Glob. Payments, Inc., 2013 WL 440702, at *20
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013); Azeltine v. Bank of Am., 2010 WL 6511710, at *10 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2010);
Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards In Electronic Transactions, Inc., 2010 WL 1799456, at *9 (D.N.J.
May 4, 2010); Meyer v. Christie, 2007 WL 3120695, at *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007); Trikas v. Universal
Card Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 37, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). On the decision to count both Mireskandari
decisions, see supra note 142.
154.
Starkey v. Staples, Inc., 2013 WL 5936898 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2013), vacated
(Nov. 5, 2013); Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., 2013 WL 12172926 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2013);
Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards In Electronic Transactions, Inc., 2010 WL 1799456 (D.N.J. May 4,
2010); Meyer v. Christie, 2007 WL 3120695 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007).
155.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14.
156.
Assuming arguendo that the holding in Perkins v. LinkedIn, a shield case, is
relevant to the question.
157.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14.
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E. Summary
The Draft identifies three results from the quantitative study of privacy
policy decisions in support of the proposed comment 9 to section 1: a high
proportion of decisions treating privacy policies as contract terms, a clear and
increasing trend in that direction, and the greater influence of decisions enforcing
privacy policies in contract. The Reporters’ data do not support these claims. The
power of any empirically based prediction is a function of the strength of the
observed effect and the size of the sample. This study’s independent coding finds
a significantly weaker effect than does the Draft (less than three-to-one vs. sevento-one) in a significantly smaller set of relevant decisions (fifteen vs. forty). This
is much weaker quantitative evidence for the proposed comment than the
Reporters find. Nor does this study find significant support for the trend reported
in the Draft. Although there was a large increase in the proportion of contract
decisions between 2004 and 2010, there was some downward movement
between 2010 and 2015. And some or all of the increase that the Reporters
observe might be due to their questionable coding of the shield decisions.
Finally, decisions treating privacy policies as possible contract terms have not
been more often cited for that proposition than have decisions refusing
enforcement in contract.
III.

Qualitative Analysis of the Evidence

As noted in Section III.A, neither the Draft Restatement nor the Chicago
Article provides the criteria used for coding cases. The Reporters frequently
describe their results as finding that courts “recognize” privacy notices as
contracts.158 “Recognition” is not a legal term of art and might encompass a wide
range of judicial expressions. In a few places, the Reporters suggest stronger
findings. Thus, the Reporters’ Notes to section 1 characterize the “dominant
jurisprudence in this area” as “the JetBlue approach, which held that privacy
notices can create contractual obligations,” and conclude that “privacy notices
are contracts.”159 Similarly, the Chicago Article states that question was
“whether courts enforce privacy practices as contracts.”160
Because the Reporters did not specify the strength of the legal authority in
their coded cases, this study adopted a generous coding rule. As described in
Section III.A, any decisions that might be cited for or against the Draft’s
proposed rule was counted. This was true whether the evidence was holding or
dicta, and whether the decision stated that a posted privacy was a contract term,

158.
See DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15; Bar-Gill et al., supra note
3, at 28-29; see also DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15 (describing cases as “embracing
privacy notices as contracts”); Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 28 (stating that “two state appellate courts
. . . have suggested that privacy policies could be contracts”).
159.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14, 16.
160.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 26.
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that it might be a contract term, or merely held that a contract claim could go
forward.
All this raises the question: Given the decisions that this study and the
Reporters’ study coded as contract, what do their numerical results tell us about
the state of the law? This Part addresses that question with a qualitative
assessment of the decisions in the Reporters’ dataset and their coding. Section
IV.A discusses the types of decisions that comprise the Reporters’ dataset.
Section IV.B describes difficulties in identifying authority in those decisions,
persuasive or binding, for the Reporters’ proposed comment. Section IV.C
summarizes and draws conclusions.
A. Composition of the Dataset
Two generic features of the decisions in the Reporters’ dataset are relevant
to assessing how much support they provide for the proposed comment. First,
the vast majority of decisions are from federal trial courts. Second, most of the
decisions were reached on motions to dismiss. These features also explain the
difficulty of coding many of the cases, discussed the next section.
1. Lack of Appellate Decisions
Of the fifty-one decisions in the dataset, only one is from an appellate court,
Gwinnett Community Bank v. Arlington Capital, LLC,161 discussed in Section
II.C. This study coded the decision as irrelevant because the case was a businessto-business dispute and the court did not address the enforceability of the bank’s
consumer privacy policy. Of the remaining decisions, two were from state trial
courts and forty-eight from federal district courts or federal bankruptcy courts.
When appellate courts have not yet ruled on a question of law, it is
reasonable to ask how trial courts handle it. Because of their high degree of
competence, district court judgments about what the law requires are good
evidence of what the law is, and accordingly enjoy considerable persuasive
authority. In the absence of appellate decisions, it is therefore worth knowing
how trial courts rule on claims that businesses’ privacy policies generate belong
to their contracts with consumers.
That said, there is a significant difference between a legal question on
which appellate courts have spoken and one that no state or federal appellate
court has yet addressed. In making the case for treating out-of-state citations as
more significant for weighting purposes, the Reporters emphasize that “[s]uch
courts are not bound by the cited . . . cases under stare decisis principles.”162 In

161.
326 Ga. App. 710 (2014). The Chicago Article states in passing that “the two state
appellate courts to address this issue have suggested that privacy policies could be contracts.” Bar-Gill et
al., supra note 3, at 28. The authors do not cite the two decisions they intend to refer to. There is not a
second appellate decision in the dataset.
162.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 15-16.
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fact, a federal district court ruling on a question of law is never binding on
another court—including another district court within the same jurisdiction or
even the same court in a different case.163 Federal district courts do not make
federal law, much less the law of the state in which they sit. That is the job of
state and, when there is no contrary binding authority, federal appellate courts.
With respect to binding precedent—one natural understanding of what the law
is—a district court decision is no more significant than that of an arbitration
panel. The absence of any appellate decisions—federal or state—on the
Reporters’ question suggests that it might not be ripe for Restatement.
The lack of appellate decisions also has practical consequences for attempts
to quantify judicial reasoning and holdings. Because trial court decisions are of
limited precedential value, trial judges are less likely than are appellate judges to
fully describe the facts of the case, to identify a single ratio decidendi, or to
provide a systematic discussion of relevant legal issues. Often the goal is to
dispose of the case at bar and to forestall reversal on appeal, rather than to
provide future courts guidance on how to decide similar cases. Thus, a trial court
might simply state that the privacy policy might be part of the contract, without
explaining how customers assented to the policy, whether it was mentioned in
separately agreed-to terms of service, or even the rule that the court is
applying.164 As a result, it can be much more difficult to code the holding,
reasoning and even relevant dicta in a trial court decision than it is in an appellate
decision. That difficulty has consequences for the reproducibility and reliability
of a quantitative study’s coding and numerical results.
2. Procedural Posture
Of the fifty-one decisions in the Reporters’ dataset, thirty-five—over twothirds—were issued on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.165 Nine considered
motions for summary judgment. The remaining decisions were on pre-discovery
motions for class certification, to compel arbitration, to dismiss for improper
venue, to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or to transfer. Of the
thirty-five decisions that the Reporters coded as contract, thirty were reached on
pre-discovery motions. Of the eleven cases this study coded as contract, ten were
reached on motions to dismiss.
The high proportion of Rule 12(b)(6) decisions is also significant. The
question before the court on such motions is not the actual legal effect of the
163.
18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02(1)(d), at
134-26 (3d ed. 2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a
different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.”).
164.
See, e.g., Yunker v. Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30829 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10,
2014); In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
165.
Many of the decisions involved multiple motions on different issues. A Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for example, might be accompanied by a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing. This section describes only the procedural posture relevant
to the contractual or neighboring issues.
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privacy policy, but whether the plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to survive the
motion. And though some of the Rule 12(b)(6) decisions take judicial notice of
the substance of the privacy policy,166 others identify factual issues as
sufficiently pled but expressly leave their resolution for a later stage in the
proceedings.167 One decision in the dataset, issued before the Supreme Court
raised federal pleading requirements, emphasizes the low bar of notice
pleading.168
The import of a Rule 12(b)(6) decision turns in part on the holding. If the
court grants the motion to dismiss a claim of breach, it holds that there is no
contract claim. Here the procedural posture does not much matter, and if the ratio
decidendi is relevant to the study, the case should be coded as no contract. If the
court denies the motion, it holds only that the policy might be a term in the
contract, not that it is one. Here the procedural posture is crucial to the weight
given the decision—and thereby also to the Reporters’ conclusion that courts are
likely to recognize privacy policies as contract terms.
Although the Reporters coded for procedural posture,169 neither the Draft
Restatement nor the Chicago Article discusses the high proportion of decisions
on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, much less whether some or all
of those decisions should be weighted differently.
B. Coding Decisions
The Reporters are eminent law professors and experienced empiricists.
Some variation is always to be expected among independent empirical studies of
the same question, or separate codings of the same decisions. But there is a very
large gap between this study’s results and those of the Reporters. Much of the
gap derives from differences in the coding of decisions. This section provides a
qualitative analysis of those differences. The goal is not to explain or justify
every coding decision in this study. For basic explanations, the reader can look
166.
This is often the case in the shield decisions. See, e.g., Toney v. Quality Resources,
Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 727, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (taking judicial notice of privacy policy and converting
motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment); In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2013 WL 5423918,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (granting Google’s motion to take judicial notice of its terms of service
and privacy policies); Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com Inc., 2011 WL 6325910, at *4, *13 n.7 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 30, 2011) (discussing details of Amazon’s privacy policy).
167.
See, e.g., Garcia v. Enter. Holdings, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1138 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (shield case dismissing privacy claim based on plaintiff’s failure to plead lack of consent to privacy
policy, but granting plaintiff leave to amend complaint); Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec.
Transactions, Inc., 2010 WL 1799456, at *9 (D.N.J. March 15, 2011) (“[G]iving [the pro se] Plaintiff the
benefit of the doubt, he seems to have alleged that all of the above provisions were part of his agreement
with Comcast and that he relied on them.”); In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2005 WL 3323028,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2005) (“The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether
he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim.”); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 299, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (reasoning that “the issue of who actually read and relied on the policy
would be addressed more properly at the class certification stage”).
168.
Loeffler v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 2006 WL 1796008, at *4 (D. Nev. June 26,
2006). Section IV.B.3 provides a detailed discussion of the Loeffler decision.
169.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 17 n.25.
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to the parentheticals to case citations in Section III.C, to the descriptions in the
Appendix, and to the comments in the coded data posted online. The aim is rather
to identify the types of judgments that the coding required and where the two
studies generally disagreed on those judgments. A closer look at a representative
sample of judicial opinions also illustrates the difficulties in coding trial court
decisions, especially on a motion to dismiss. And it exposes the weakness of the
authority that the Reporters found for the proposed comment.
1. Inapposite Decisions and Decisions with No Relevant Holding or
Statement
Because the Reporters have neither published their coding rubric nor
described individual coding choices, one can only guess at the judgments that lie
behind their coding. Some coding simply appears to be mistaken.
For example, four of the fifty-one decisions in the dataset involved
business-to-business contract claims, not consumer-to-business claims.170 I have
already discussed one example: Gwinnett Community Bank v. Arlington
Capitol.171 Another is Meyer v. Christie.172 This case involved two real estate
developers’ suit against a bank, based on the bank’s disclosure of their financial
information to other developers in the project.173 On the motion to dismiss the
court rejected the bank’s argument that “its privacy policy [was] nothing more
than a mere unilateral statement of company policy,”174 which perhaps explains
why the Reporters coded the case as contract. But the plaintiff developers were
not consumers under the Restatement definition, “individual[s] acting primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes.”175 Moreover, the court’s reasons
for holding that the privacy policy might be part of the contract included the
parties’ long-term relationship, one plaintiff’s claimed reliance on the privacy
policy, and the bank’s demand for the information as a condition of entering into
the transaction.176 None of these correspond to the typical consumer contract. It
is difficult to understand why this and the other decisions in business-to-business
disputes were counted in a study of consumer contracts.

170.
See supra note 95.
171.
326 Ga. App. 710 (2014); see supra Section II.C.
172.
2007 WL 3120695 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007).
173.
Id. at *1-*3.
174.
Id. at *4.
175.
Draft Restatement §§ 1(a)(1).
176.
“Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Mr. Meyer had a long-term banking business
and banking relationship with Security Savings; that in the course of that relationship he relied on the
bank to preserve his confidential information according to the terms of its privacy policy; and that the
bank had solicited his financial information when it requested that he act as a personal guarantor on the
loans that it made to [Meyer’s other business]. Inferentially, then, the bank’s privacy policy was part and
parcel of its offer to make the loan to [the business], which was accepted when Mr. Meyer divulged
information to the bank with the understanding that the bank would keep it confidential in accordance
with its privacy policy. Under this view of the facts, the bank’s privacy policy constituted part of Mr.
Meyer’s bargained-for exchange with the bank.” Meyer, 2007 WL 3120695, at *4.
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Nor is it clear why the Reporters included decisions in which there was
neither a breach of contract claim nor an attempt to use the privacy policy as
defense against alleged privacy violations.177 The Reporters coded Browning v.
AT&T, for example, as recognizing the privacy policy as a contract. Yet the
complaint in Browning did not include a claim for breach,178 and the defendant
did not attempt to invoke the policy as a shield against the plaintiff’s statutory
and tort privacy claims.179 The plaintiff did argue that the defendant’s privacy
policy violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The court rejected that claim
based on its finding that the privacy policy permitted the disclosures in question.
That reasoning might look similar to the reasoning in some contract cases. The
legal question, however, was neither whether there was a breach of contract nor
whether the plaintiff consented to the disclosure, but whether the policy was
deceptive.
Also difficult to understand is the choice to count decisions that turned on
terms embedded in clickwrap agreements, rather than separate privacy
policies.180 In Johnson v. Microsoft, for example, the district court found that
Microsoft’s clickwrap EULA, which users were required to accept before
installing its software, did not prohibit the collection of IP addresses, and on that
basis granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’
breach of contract claim.181 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the EULA incorporated Microsoft’s
security glossary, which was separately available on its website.182 The court
explained later in the opinion that “[s]tatements or definitions found on web sites
unrelated to the EULA do not bind or obligate the parties, and cannot give rise
to a claim for breach of contract.”183 This study codes the decision as irrelevant,
as it did not involve a claim based on a privacy policy. The Reporters coded it as
recognizing the privacy policy as a contract, despite the lack of a holding to that
effect and the court’s suggestions to the contrary.
2. Shield Decisions
The coding of the shield decisions, which accounts for a significant portion
of the difference between the two studies’ results, deserves special attention.184
In a shield case, the defendant invokes its privacy policy against one or more

177.
See supra note 107.
178.
Browning v. AT&T Corp., 682 F. Supp. 2d 832, 841-44 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(dismissing a claim of violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act).
179.
Browning, 682 F. Supp. 2d. at 835-41.
180.
See supra notes 97 & 98.
181.
Johnson v. Microsoft, 2009 WL 1794400, at *3-*5 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2009).
182.
Id. at *12 (“Because the EULA does not incorporate the web glossary by reference,
and there is no evidence that any of the Plaintiffs even read the glossary, the court finds that the web
glossary is not helpful to construing the provision.”).
183.
Id. at *14 (describing the holding in the analysis of the privacy claim).
184.
Supra Section III.B.3.
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claims of non-contractual privacy violations. This study found in all the shield
decisions in the dataset, courts looked not to the law of contract, but to tort and
statutory law to determine the requirements for a legally effective consent to the
use in question.185
Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., provides a good example. The district court in
Perkins held that the privacy policy shielded the defendant against claimed
violations of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and the Wiretap Act. The
court’s analysis of these questions is more fulsome than that of others, but
otherwise representative:
The SCA exempts from its coverage conduct “authorized . . . by the
person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service,”
[18 U.S.C.] § 2701(c)(1), or “by a user of that service with respect to a
communication of or intended for that user,” id. § 2701(c)(2). While there
is relatively scant authority on the definition of “authorized” under the
SCA, the Ninth Circuit has analogized authorization under the SCA to
consent that defeats a common law trespass claim. Theofel v. Farey–
Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which the Ninth Circuit cited for this proposition, describes the
consent exception as follows: “If words or conduct are reasonably
understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent
consent and are as effective as consent in fact.” Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 892.
. . . . Under [the Wiretap Act], it is not unlawful “to intercept a wire, oral,
or electronic communication . . . where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception.” Consent to
an interception can be explicit or implied, but any consent must be actual.
[citations omitted] “[G]enerally, consent must be express, but consent
may be implied where there are surrounding circumstances indicating that
the defendant knowingly agreed to the surveillance.” U.S. v. Staves, 383
F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the
[the Wiretap Act] milieu as in other settings, consent inheres where a
person’s behavior manifests acquiescence or a comparable voluntary

185.
One case used the existence of a contract in analyzing a shield defense but did not
turn on the contract analysis. In Cain v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 136 F. Supp. 3d 824 (2015), the
court held on summary judgment that plaintiffs had provided “written permission” as required by
Michigan’s Video Rental Privacy Act (VRPA), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1713, for the defendant’s use
of consumer information. The written permission requirement was satisfied when customers completed
the transaction after a notice reading, “By pressing ‘pay’ or ‘use credits’ you agree to the Terms,” and
where the terms of use expressly referenced salient permissions in the defendant’s privacy policy. Cain,
136 F. Supp. 3d at 833-37. Although the court stated that the clickwrap terms of use were a contract, the
salient question was whether proceeding with the transaction after notice constituted written permission
under the VRPA. The court’s analysis of the issue presupposes that the mere availability of the policy
prior to checkout was not enough to satisfy the VRPA. Moreover, the court held that the terms of use did
not “completely adopt the Privacy Policy in its entirety.” Id. at 834.
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diminution of his or her otherwise protected rights.” Griggs–Ryan v.
Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir.1990).
There may be subtle differences between the consent exception to Wiretap
Act liability and the authorization exception to SCA liability. However,
the parties conceded, and the Court finds that for the purposes of the
instant Motion, the question under both is essentially the same: Would a
reasonable user who viewed the LinkedIn’s disclosures have understood
that LinkedIn was collecting email addresses from the user’s external
email account such that the user’s acquiescence demonstrates that she
consented to or authorized the collection?186

Nowhere in the above analysis does the court refer to contract law or to the
rules of contract formation. Nor did the plaintiff in the case claim breach of
contract. Yet the Reporters coded the case as recognizing the privacy policy as a
term of the contract.
The Reporters presumably had a reason for including the shield decisions
in their study. Although consent to an otherwise impermissible act and assent to
an adhesive contract are distinct legal concepts, they are neighbors. If courts are
lowering the bar for consent to what would otherwise be a privacy violation, one
might guess that they could be lowering it for contractual assent to privacy
policies. And given the small number of sword cases (twenty-four by the
Reporters’ count, thirty-one by this study’s), perhaps it makes sense to look to
decisions on a neighboring legal question for guidance. That said, if this is the
Reporters’ reason for including the shield cases, their sample could be skewed.
The Reporters’ search criteria appear to have been designed for finding contract
cases, not a complete or representative sample of privacy cases.187 One should
therefore take care before drawing conclusions from the Reporters’ data about
rules of consent in privacy law.
More importantly, the Reporters make no argument like the one considered
above, either in the Draft Restatement or in the Chicago Article. In their
published results, the Reporters do not explain the differences between the
judicial reasoning in the sword and in the shield cases or disaggregate the results
of each. Quite the contrary. The Reporters’ Notes describe shield decisions as
those in which “firms, as defendants, sought to enforce their own policies,
arguing that they constitute contracts and that consumers’ assent to them operates
as a defense against the alleged privacy violations.”188 In fact, the shield
decisions (as coded by this study) do not discuss whether the privacy policies

186.
Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp.3d 1190, 1212-13 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see
also, e.g., id. at 1215 (discussing rules for consent under common law right of publicity); In re Yahoo
Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp.3d 1016, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (discussing rules for consent under Wiretap Act);
Toney v. Quality Resources, Inc., 75 F. Supp.3d 727, 734-35 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (discussing rules for consent
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
187.
See Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 27 n.65 (describing search methods).
188.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 14 (emphasis added).
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constitute contracts. Nor do their holdings—shielding the defendant from
liability for non-contractual privacy violations—have all the legal consequences
that a contractual obligation would. The shield case count might capture some
courts’ application of a neighboring rule. But it says nothing about whether
courts are treating privacy policies as contract terms. Rather than “render[ing the
Restatement’s] recommendations more transparent and reliable,”189 the inclusion
of the shield cases without further explanation obscures the degree of empirical
support for the Reporters’ “conclusion that privacy notices are contracts.”190
3. Case-Specific Judgments and the Limited Authority of Many
Decisions
The shield cases are not the only examples of coding that clouds important
features of decisions in the dataset. Section II.C discussed an example: In re
JetBlue Airways Corporation Privacy Litigation191 which the Reporters’ Notes
identify as a leading case, but in fact contains only limited support for the
proposition that courts treat privacy policies as contract terms. Three other
examples illustrate the limitations of the tripartite coding of contract, no contract
or not relevant as applied to the decisions in the dataset, and the limited
persuasive authority of decisions the Reporters coded as supporting the proposed
comment.
The first is Loeffler v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co.192 Here the defendant argued
for dismissal of the breach of contract claim because the complaint failed to
mention its privacy policy. The district court accordingly focused on whether the
plaintiff’s complaint was pled with sufficient specificity, observing that “[t]he
present pleading leaves out what Plaintiff claims is a critical element, i.e. that the
claimed implied contract incorporates Defendant’s alleged strong policy of
confidentiality.”193 The court nonetheless concluded that “the contract is plead
sufficiently to meet notice pleading standards.”194 Because that holding
suggested that the privacy policy could generate contractual obligations, this
study coded it as supporting the Reporters’ position. The Reporters’ coding
agreed.
That classification, however, does not capture everything of relevance in
the case. First, the decision was reached in 2006, a year before the Supreme Court
first suggested, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, a heightened federal pleading
standard.195 One wonders whether the motion to dismiss would succeed today.

189.
Id. at Reporters’ Introduction at 5-6.
190.
Id. § 1, Reporters’ Notes at 16.
191.
379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
192.
2006 WL 1796008 (D. Nev. June 28, 2006).
193.
Id. at *4.
194.
Id.
195.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (raising the bar for notice
pleading); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (same).
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Certainly, the court’s application of the pre-Twombly standard would be an
obvious objection to citing the decision. Second, in the same opinion the court
expressed doubt as to whether the privacy policy alone created a contract. “We
observe incidentally that the Complaint may sufficiently allege that Defendant’s
alleged privacy policy could have been incorporated into the claimed contracts
for lodging, but that violation by Defendant of its own privacy policy, in and of
itself, would not confer a right of action on Plaintiff.”196 The italicized clause is
dicta. But such a decision is far from robust evidence of a trend toward the
treatment of online privacy policies as standard contract terms pursuant to the
rules described in the Draft’s sections 2 and 3. Third, a glance at the docket
reveals that the court subsequently granted defendant Ritz-Carlton’s motion for
summary judgment, and later awarded it over $26,000 in fees and costs.197 The
court did not issue a written opinion, but in announcing its decision from the
bench stated, “we conclude that there is no evidence that the defendant’s privacy
policy constituted a contractual agreement with plaintiff under these
circumstances.”198 In its motion for summary judgment, Ritz-Carlton extensively
discussed both Dyer and In re Northwest Airlines, the two leading cases rejecting
the Reporters’ proposed approach.199 The mere fact that the on the motion to
dismiss the court held that in theory the privacy policy could have been
integrated into the contract is very weak support for the claim that such policies
are subject to the rules of the Draft section 2.
The limits of the tripartite coding scheme can again be seen in Claridge v.
RockYou,200 also coded by both this and the Reporters’ study as contract. Like
Loeffler, RockYou involved claims that the defendant breached both its implied
and express contractual obligations, though RockYou was filed as a class action.
This study coded it as contract because the district court rejected RockYou’s
motion to dismiss, allowing the contract claims to go forward.201
The court’s opinion, however, considered only the two arguments in
RockYou’s motion to dismiss: that the plaintiff had failed to plead injury, and
that the policy expressly provided that no liability would result from the acts
complained of.202 Looking back to the filings, one finds that RockYou did not

196.
197.

2006 WL 1796008, at *4 (emphasis added).
Docket, Loeffler v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., No. 2:06-CV-00333 (D. Nev.), items

54 & 55.
198.
Reporter’s Transcript of Motion Hearing No. 38 at 17, Loeffler v. Ritz-Carlton
Hotel Co., 2:06-CV-00333 (D. Nev. June 10, 2008); see also id. at 13 (“[T]here is no contention here that
the privacy policy was a part of any express, explicit agreement between the parties. There was no offer
or acceptance and there is no evidence in this record that any such agreement was incorporated by
reference into any offer or acceptance.”). The court also held even if the privacy policy were a part of the
contract, the defendant’s actions would not have breached it. Id. at 17.
199.
Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-12, Loeffler v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel
Co., 2:06-CV-00333 (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2008).
200.
785 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
201.
Id. at 865-66.
202.
Id. at 864-65.
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make a formation argument.203 Consequently, although the court allowed the
contract claims to go forward, it was neither required nor chose to address the
Reporters’ question: whether or when a business’s online privacy policy is part
of its contract with the consumer. RockYou settled the class action—which also
involved surviving claims under the Stored Communications Act and common
law negligence—shortly after the court’s decision.204
A final illustration can be found in the district court’s ruling in Burton v.
Time Warner Cable.205 In this case, the consumer-plaintiff originally claimed
inter alia that Time Warner had breached an implied contract with its customers
to comply with industry standards for handling personally identifiable
information.206 Time Warner responded that its Privacy Notice was part of its
express contract with customers, permitted the use of the information, and
therefore forestalled the implied-contract claim. Apparently without waiting for
the court to rule on that defense, the plaintiff dropped his implied-contract claim
and requested leave to add a claim of breach of express contract based on the
privacy policy. In its motion to dismiss, Time Warner also raised objections to
that new claim. The court granted leave to amend, but expressly declined to
“address any of the arguments [Time Warner] put forth in its [motion] as to . . .
the potentially amended express contract claim, until that claim is properly
before the Court.”207
How should this case be coded with respect to the Reporters’ question: Do
courts enforce privacy policies as contracts? Time Warner’s argument that its
privacy policy was part of the contract, and therefore forestalled the plaintiff’s
implied-contract claim, seems to have won the day. The plaintiff withdrew the
implied-contract claim. But because the plaintiff withdrew that claim, the court
did not have occasion to rule on, or even discuss, Time Warner’s express contract
defense. The court’s decision to permit the plaintiff to add a claim of breach of
express contract based on the privacy policy would seem to presuppose that some
such claims are viable. Yet the court expressly declined to address the sufficiency
of that claim, which had not yet been pled. Because the court stated that it was
not ruling on the as yet unpled claim of breach, this study coded Burton as
irrelevant. The Reporters coded Burton as supporting the proposed comment.
C. Summary
Part III described the numerical results of my attempt to reproduce the Draft
Restatement’s study of privacy policy cases. Using the Reporters’ data and

203.
RockYou’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 14-18, Claridge
v. RockYou, No. C-09-6032-VRW (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2010).
204.
Docket, Claridge v. RockYou, No. C-09-6032-VRW (N.D. Cal.), item 58.
205.
2013 WL 3337784 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013).
206.
Id. at *4.
207.
Id. at *5. For another decision along the same lines, see Padilla v. Dish Network
L.L.C., 2013 WL 3791140, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013).

95

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 36, 2019

generous coding criteria, this study’s coding and analysis produced far less
quantitative support than did the Reporters’ for the proposition that a business’s
privacy policy can become part of a consumer contract pursuant to the rules of
the Draft Restatement.208 More specifically, this study’s coding and analysis
found a weaker effect in a smaller number of relevant cases, no recent trend
towards recognizing privacy policies as contracts, and that cases supporting the
proposed comment have not been more influential.
This Part’s qualitative analysis casts further doubt on the strength of the
Reporters’ quantitative evidence for the proposed comment. I have explained
why my coding differs from the Reporters’ and shown that many of the decisions
coded as supporting the proposed comment are of limited authoritative or
persuasive value. Three broad conclusions emerge.
First, there are by all appearances a number of mistakes in the Reporters’
coding. Not counting shield cases, Part III identified twenty-six, or over half, of
the fifty-one decisions in the Reporters’ dataset as not relevant to the hypothesis
being tested.209 The reasons this study coded these cases as irrelevant varied,
ranging from the fact that they did not involve consumers to non-relevant
rationes decidendi. Perhaps the Reporters had independent reasons for including
so many of these cases in their counts.210 But because neither the Draft
Restatement nor the Chicago Article provides a detailed discussion of their
coding criteria, it is difficult to know what they would be. In the absence of
further explanation, these appear to be simple coding errors.
Second, a number of the coding decisions rest on contestable judgment
calls. Most significant was the Reporters’ decision to treat shield cases as support
for the proposed comment. Much of the difference between the two studies’
quantitative results stems from my finding that the shield decisions do not
support the Reporters’ position, as the opinions neither hold nor suggest that
privacy policies might be contract terms. Other judgment calls are particular to
individual decisions, such as a 12(b)(6) ruling that a contract claim could go
forward, in which the court also suggests requirements contrary to the rules in
the Draft Restatement. The case counts and cumulative charts that the Reporters
have published and presented in the Draft Third Restatement appear at first
glance to be compelling evidence of what courts are doing on the ground. But
the numbers do not capture the individual decisions and often complicated
coding judgments that lie beneath them. Sometimes numbers obscure more than
they reveal.
Finally, the nature of the data and the expansive criteria for coding
decisions as contract means that even decisions on point provide only limited
208.
Draft Restatement § 1, cmt. 9.
209.
Supra sections III.B.1 & III.B.2. This count does not include In re Google, Inc.
Privacy Policy Litigation, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013), whose breach of contract claim
was not counted, supra note 96, but which was included in the shield count.
210.
The Reporters coded fifteen of the twenty-seven decisions as recognizing that the
privacy policy might be part of the contract, and two as rejecting the contract claim.
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support for the proposed comment. All but one of the fifty-one decisions in the
dataset were issued by trial courts, and all but nine were reached at the prediscovery motions stage. Over eighty-five percent of the decisions that the
Reporters coded as contract (thirty out of thirty-five) were reached on prediscovery motions, and over ninety percent of the decision this study coded as
contract (ten out of eleven) were on motions to dismiss. In a sword case, such a
decision says at most that the plaintiff pled sufficient facts for the case to go
forward. It does not say the business’s privacy policy is part of the contract, but
only that under some conceivable set of facts it might be. That conceivable set
of facts might not correspond to the Draft Restatement rules. Thus, several
decisions coded as contract using this study’s criteria suggest that at a later stage
the plaintiff would be required to prove reliance on the privacy policy or that the
privacy policy was “integrated” into contract between the parties—requirements
that run contrary to the formation rules in section 2. Again, the numerical
presentation of the final count fails to capture important facts about the
underlying data—facts that weaken the support for the Reporters’ conclusions.
Both in its coding and in its qualitative analysis, this study has occasionally
employed sources beyond those used by the Reporters. It has referred in some
instances to the details of a complaint, to contents of the parties’ motions, or to
subsequent decisions that do not appear in searchable databases. One might
object that the resources devoted to this attempt to reproduce and understand the
Reporters’ privacy policy study are far beyond what one could expect of large
quantitative case law studies, which deal with masses of data and often require
coding by research assistants. The point is well taken. But it also suggests the
limits of the methods the Reporters employ. The decisions collected in the
dataset, together with the Reporters’ approach to coding them, produced
numerical results that do not reflect the strength of the underlying data. I do not
believe this was the result of bad faith. It was the net effect of the types of judicial
decisions found, and of many independent coding decisions. None of that,
however, appears in the published results. One must dig deeper to understand
what the numbers mean.
IV.

Quantitative Case Law Studies and the Restatement Project

This Article has examined only one of the six quantitative studies in the
Draft Restatement. Elsewhere the Draft invokes the results of five similar
studies: of clickwrap, shrinkwrap, browsewrap, unilateral modifications, and
applications of the parol evidence rule.211 It might well be that the coding in the
other studies was more reliable and the decisions less equivocal; that the data
provide stronger support for trends that the Reporters observed; and that the
decisions that the Reporters identified as influential in fact received more
relevant citations. That said, this study’s findings suggest that those studies
211.

See supra note 2.

97

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 36, 2019

should not yet be taken as authoritative on the legal questions they address.
Among the core methodological principles of empirical science are transparency
and replication. The Reporters have not yet published their coding methods or
the coded data. Nor have their results been subject to independent scrutiny or
attempts to reproduce or replicate their findings.212
In their Introduction to the Draft, the Reporters describe their use of
quantitative studies as follows:
In order to reduce the ambiguity regarding the state of the law and offer a
comprehensive account of how courts have ruled on a given question, the standard
ALI methodology (of extracting rationales from leading cases and supporting
them with convincing policy justifications) is complemented with a methodology
that has the potential to render its recommendations more transparent and
reliable.213

The proposal is an attractive one. There has always been a tension in the
Restatements between the descriptive and the prescriptive. Although
Restatements are written as accounts of what the law is, they often pick a side on
questions on which authorities are divided, and sometimes stake out positions
ahead of most courts.214 A Reporter can always find a decision in support of their
preferred rule. Systematic empirical work on the corpus of decisions, including
unpublished and trial court decisions, would add to our understanding of the
relationship between the propositions in a Restatement and the case law.
One wonders, however, whether the existing Restatement process is suited
to that task.215 Among the fundamental checks in most empirical sciences are
peer review and replication.216 In recent years biomedical science and empirical
psychology have both seen “replication crises.” Researchers in these fields have
argued that too often a single study is treated as decisive, that professional
incentives disfavor attempts to replicate, and that a significant proportion of

212.
But see the independent results of Levitin et al., supra note 77.
213.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Reporters’ Introduction at 5-6.
214.
See N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of
the American Law Institute, 8 L. & HIST. REV. 55 (1990); Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the
Restatements, 55 AM. BAR ASSOC. J. 147 (1969); G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the
Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (1997).
215.
The arguments that follow also speak against William Baude, Adam Chilton, and
Anup Malani’s recent suggestion that judges use quantitative empirical methods, or that they take
seriously studies produced by parties to litigation. William Baude, Adam S. Chilton & Anup Malani,
Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 38, 55
(2017).
216.
See, e.g., John P. A. Ioannidis, How to Make More Published Research True, 11
PLOS MED., Oct. 21, 2014, at 1; see also Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 28 (stating that there were two
state appellate decisions in the dataset, though only one appears in it).
Although I believe peer review provides the best check on empirical work, student-edited
publications have one important advantage: student editors commonly cite check articles. I am grateful
for the cite check performed by the editors of this journal, which caught several coding or counting issues.
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published studies fail attempted replication.217 And there are special reasons to
closely examine and seek to replicate quantitative studies of judicial decisions.
As the qualitative analysis in Part IV illustrates, counting judicial statements on
a legal proposition is not like determining the ratio of black to white marbles in
a jar. Depending on the question posed and the types of decisions in the dataset,
there are often many shades of grey—or plaid, or Pollockian swirls and
splatters—in between. Coding judicial decisions can require a host of judgment
calls. Independent scrutiny and replication are therefore essential to establishing
the reliability of the results.
The American Law Institute describes the life cycle of a Restatement
Project as follows:218

Reporters produce Preliminary Drafts in consultation with the Project
Advisors and Members of a Consultative Group, bodies constituted specially for
the project.219 That drafting process results in a Council Draft, which goes to the
ALI Council.220 The Council can then do any of three things: (1) send the
Council Draft on for approval of the membership as a whole, in which case it
becomes a Tentative Draft until approved; (2) send the Draft back to the Reporter
for further revisions; or (3) present the Draft to the full membership for
discussion only, in the form of a Discussion Draft, which will subsequently be

217.
For a good summary, see Kristin Firth, David A. Hoffman & Tess WilkinsonRyan, Law and Psychology Grows Up, Goes Online, and Replicates, 15 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
320, 323-24 (2018).
218.
Am. Law Inst., Project Life Cycle, https://www.ali.org/projects/project-life-cycle/
[https://perma.cc/4XLG-SMSX].
219.
“Advisers . . . are selected for their particular knowledge and experience of the
subject or the special perspective they are able to provide. They constitute an intellectually and
geographically diverse group of practitioners, judges, and scholars and normally include one or more
members of the Council. Members Consultative Groups consist of Institute members who have a special
interest in the project’s subject.” Id.
220.
The ALI Council is “a volunteer board of directors that oversees the management
of ALI’s business and affairs. Made up of no fewer than 42 and no more than 65 members, the Council
consists of lawyers, judges, and academics, and reflects a broad range of specialties and experiences.
Council members are elected from the Institute membership for terms of five years.” American Law
Institute,
Officers
and
Council,
https://www.ali.org/about-ali/governance/officers-council/
[https://perma.cc/8NVP-E9LT].
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subject to further revisions by the Reporter. Although samizdat Preliminary
Drafts and Council Drafts are often circulated outside the ALI, the ALI website
specifies only that “Tentative Drafts, Discussion Drafts, and Proposed Final
Drafts are made available to the Public after the Annual Meeting.”221
This process is not well suited either to independent assessment of
quantitative case law studies produced within it or to attempts to replicate their
results. If independent assessment and replication are to figure into drafting
decisions, they must be performed early. Yet the ALI process does not provide
for any public input prior to a draft’s presentation to, and possible approval by,
the Council, and perhaps even the membership.222 Nor has the ALI established
any mechanisms for publicizing coding criteria or coded data, or for inviting
other researchers to examine the methods and attempt to replicate the results of
quantitative studies as part of the drafting process. Restatements are not crowdsourced. They are written, debated and approved by a closed group of experts in
the field.
This is not to say that Reporters who wish to incorporate such studies could
not publicize their methods, the coding rubric, and the coded data on their own
and invite others to examine them and attempt to replicate the results. But it is
not obvious exactly how this would fit into the ALI process. Would Reporters
integrate quantitative empirical results into a draft before other researchers had
corroborated them? Waiting could mean considerable delay. Yet including the
results might mean sending a draft to the Council with studies that had not yet
been subject to external review and verification.
The Reporters for the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law incorporated
the results of their studies long before anyone else had seen the data or coding,
much less had attempted to reproduce the results. Nor have the Reporters yet
made their coding methods or coded data public. In the Chicago Article, the
Reporters state, “We emphasize the importance of transparency, and we will
make our databases, search criteria, and coding decisions publicly available once
the Restatement is published.”223 If “published” means after final approval by
the ALI membership, it is not obvious how the two halves of that sentence fit
together. A scholar might wait until publication to share their data and coding.
But the Restatements are not mere scholarly projects. Courts have traditionally
granted them significant persuasive authority—much more than the average law

221.
Am. Law Inst., supra note 218.
222.
The Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts was first presented to the Council
in February of 2017. The ALI’s 2015-2016 Annual Report stated that it was possible that the Restatement
of Consumer contracts “may appear on the 2017 Annual Meeting Agenda, potentially completing this
project”—that is, a few months after the Council would have approved it. 2015-2016 AM. LAW INST.
ANNUAL REPORT 14, https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/d6/07/d607955b-a668-4459-bb44ca26c817bcae/annualreport-web-2016update.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5ZA-9YLV].
223.
Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 9 n.2; see also id. at 14 (“[W]e make the database
and our analysis openly available to allow replication or rebuttal of our conclusions.”).
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review article.224 Including empirical work that has not been subject to the
highest standards of review and verification puts that authority at risk.
Among the basic principles of the empirical sciences—natural, social or
legal—are transparency and replication. Especially given the judgments that can
figure into coding judicial decisions, a quantitative study of those decisions
should not be treated as verified until the methods and data have been made
publicly available, and the results corroborated. By the same token, the case law
studies in the Draft Restatement should not be treated as authoritative until the
Reporters make their rubric, data and coding publicly available for examination
and assessment, and other researchers take on the project of attempting to
separately replicate their results.
V.

Conclusion

The Reporters describe their quantitative studies of judicial decisions as
supplementing rather than supplanting the traditional methods of case law
research.225 The authority for the Draft’s proposed rules does not rise and fall on
the six quantitative studies they describe. At the same time, the Reporters tout
their studies as an important methodological advance in the ALI’s project of
restating the law. The method can make a Restatement’s “recommendations
more transparent and reliable,” and “make[] it possible to examine with greater
subtlety the preeminent patterns within the law and measure their impact.”226
Nor should one minimize the persuasive power of numbers and graphs. No
matter how much or how little the Reporters relied on their quantitative case law
studies in drafting the black-letter rules and comments, many readers are likely
to give those studies considerable weight. Today those readers include the ALI
Council and membership. If the Draft is approved, the audience will include
courts looking for authoritative guidance on what the law is.
The problem is that the numbers can eclipse the many judgment calls that
go into producing them. This Article has argued that the Reporters’ privacy
policy data do not support the conclusions they draw. To date the five other
quantitative case law studies whose results the Draft Restatement reports and
relies on have not been fully evaluated or replicated by other scholars. As such,
these studies should not yet be treated as authoritative—certainly not by courts,
and also not by those who might be asked to vote on a Council or Tentative Draft.
All this suggests a relative advantage of the qualitative empiricism of
earlier Restatements. Although the approach is sometimes less comprehensive
in coverage and does not always explain the choice of leading cases, it is more

224.
But see Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064, 1069-70 (2015) (Scalia, J., &
Thomas, J., each concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that section 39 of the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment has little or no support in the case law, and criticizing the
majority’s reliance on it).
225.
See, e.g., DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Reporters’ Introduction at 6.
226.
Id. at 5-6.
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transparent along other dimensions. When a Reporters’ Note discusses a judicial
opinion or provides a string cite to a list of decisions, it is an easy thing for a
reader to pull the opinions, to read them, and to use familiar tools to check for
negative authority and find additional decisions on the same question. Purely
quantitative studies, even when they publish the data, lack this type of
transparency. Not every reader will have the time or resources to go back to the
data, recode the cases, and assess the analytic tools. This is not to say quantitative
case law studies are without value. But they require transparency and
corroboration, and they should be used with an appreciation of the limits of what
they tell us about the law.
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Appendix: Cases and Coding
Draft
Restatement
Coding
no contract

Klass
Coding
irrelevant

Azeltine v. Bank of
Am., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
142693 (D. Ariz.)

neither

contract

Bassett v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36175 (E.D.N.Y.)

contract

irrelevant

Be In, Inc. v.
Google Inc., 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
147047 (N.D. Cal.)

neither

inapposite

Case
Austin-Spearman v.
AARP Servs., 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84315 (D.D.C.)

Description
Court granted 12(b)(6) motion on
contract claim and 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss for lack of standing, holding:
(1) sharing of information did not violate
PP, and (2) no injury. In its injury
analysis, court held that PP was not part
of membership agreement. But this was
not about enforceability of PP. PP
appears to have been clickwrap:
“viewed, and agreed to.”
Magistrate recommended dismissal with
leave for plaintiff to amend breach of
contract claim to allege diversity,
reliance on PP and injury.
Recommendation accepted by District
Court, 2011 WL 1465462. Leave to
amend and magistrate’s reasoning
suggests contract claim at least possible,
hence coded as contract. But plaintiff
was required to plead and prove actual
reliance. Pro se.
Magistrate recommendation to grant
motion to compel arbitration, based on
clause in clickwrap TOS that covered
“any and all disputes.” Arbitration clause
was not in clickwrap PP, though PP
mentioned in passing. District court
adopted magistrate’s recommendation to
grant motion to compel arbitration. 93
F.Supp. 3d 95.
Website operator alleged Google
violated not PP, but browsewrap TOS
related to use of code. Court granted
12(b)(6) motion, based on plaintiff’s
failure to plead details of font size,
placement or text of the link.
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Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
irrelevant

Burton v. Time
Warner Cable, Inc.,
2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94310 (C.D.
Cal.)

contract

irrelevant

Cain v. Redbox
Automated Retail,
LLC, 136 F. Supp.
3d 824 (E.D. Mich.
2015)

contract

shield /
no
contract

Case
Browning v. AT&T
Corp., 682
F.Supp.2d 832
(N.D. Ill. 2009)

Carlsen v.
GameStop Inc.,
2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72297 (D.
Minn.)
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neither

irrelevant

Description
No breach of contract claim. The only
issue involving PP was alleged
violations of Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act. Court granted 12(b)(6) motion on
that claim, as PP permitted defendant’s
actions and therefore was not deceptive.
Plaintiff claimed implied contract to
abide by industry standards. Defendant
responded that actual PP governed and
permitted uses. Plaintiff dropped implied
contract claim. Court granted
defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion with leave
to replead breach of PP. “The Court will
not address any of the arguments TWC
put forth in its MTD as to . . . the
potentially amended express contract
claim, until that claim is properly before
the Court.”
Shield: Court granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on
Michigan Video Rental Privacy Act
claim. Clickwrap Terms of Use satisfied
the Act’s written consent requirements;
Terms of Use expressly partially
incorporated PP; and PP permitted
actions complained of.
Sword: Court granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on
contract claim because under Illinois law
only portions of PP expressly referenced
in Terms of Use were incorporated into
it.
Court granted 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
for lack of standing, based on no injury
in fact. In summarizing plaintiff’s
complaint, court states that clickwrap
TOS incorporated privacy policy. No
discussion of or ruling on the substance
of plaintiff’s contract or other claims.
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Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
contract

Daniels v. JP
Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 2011
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
4510 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.)

contract

inapposite

Deering v.
CenturyTel, Inc.,
2011 WL 1842859
(D. Mont.)

contract

shield

Del Vecchio v.
Amazon.com, Inc.,
2011 WL 6325910
(W.D. Wash.)

contract

shield

Case
Claridge v.
RockYou, 785 F.
Supp. 2d 855 (N.D.
Cal. 2011)

Description
Plaintiff created account with defendant
for online services. In denying 12(b)(6)
motion, court considered only
defendant’s argument that plaintiff failed
to plead injury and that PP included
exculpatory clauses. Court rejected both
and denied motion. No discussion of
plaintiff’s assent to PP.
“Opinion withdrawn from publication at
the direction of the court.” Found on
Bloomberg. Breach claim based on
violation of “Account Agreement, which
contains a privacy policy.” Court granted
12(b)(6) motion, as (1) magistrate’s
subpoena insulated bank from any
liability pursuant to it; (2) plaintiffs did
not cite any provision of the Account
Agreement or PP that was breached.
Court relied on Mortensen v. Bresnan
(same plaintiff attorneys) to grant
12(b)(6) motion on Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and
invasion of privacy claims, based on
consent. “[T]here is no reasonable
expectation of privacy when a plaintiff
has been notified that his Internet
activity may be forwarded to a third
party.” No discussion of whether PP was
part of contract.
Court granted 12(b)(1) motion on
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim,
based on failure to plead injury. In
permitting plaintiffs to amend complaint,
court expressed concern that PP
authorized alleged actions by providing
notice of them. No discussion of whether
PP was a contract term.
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Case
Dunbar v. Google,
Inc., 2011 WL
12907501 (E.D.
Tex.)

Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Vol. 36, 2019

Klass
Coding
shield

Dyer v. Northwest
Airlines Corps., 334
F.Supp. 2d 1196
(D.N.D. 2004)

no contract

no
contract

Freedman v.
America Online,
Inc., 325 F.Supp. 2d
638 (E.D. Va. 2004)

contract

irrelevant

Garcia v. Enterprise
Holdings, Inc., 78
F.Supp.3d 1125
(N.D. Cal. 2015)

contract

shield

106

Description
On 12(b)(6) motion on Electronic
Communications Privacy Act claim,
court suggested that clickwrap TOS
might constitute consent to uses of data.
Clickwrap PP also mentioned, but not
discussed as possibly authorizing data
use. Motion to dismiss denied because
complaint alleged uses beyond those in
TOS.
Court granted 12(b)(6) motion on
contract claim, holding (1) broad
statements of policy in PP did not give
rise to contract claims, (2) plaintiffs did
not allege that they read the PP before
purchasing tickets, and (3) plaintiffs
failed to allege contractual damages.
Integrated member agreement stipulated
that the PP was not enforceable, so
plaintiff withdrew breach claim. Thus,
the court never reached issue of
enforceability of PP. No attempt to use
PP as shield against Electronic
Communications Privacy Act claim.
Court granted 12(b)(6) motion on
Connecticut UDAP claim, as member
agreement provided that Virginia law
governed. Pro se.
Clickwrap TOS and PP. Court granted
12(b)(6) motion on California Invasion
of Privacy Act claim, based on plaintiff’s
failure to allege lack of consent despite
clickwrap TOS and PP. Leave to amend
so plaintiff might allege lack of consent,
which court treated as fact question.
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Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
irrelevant

Gwinnett Cmty.
Bank v. Arlington
Capital, LLC, 326
Ga. App. 710 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2014)

contract

inapposite

Hodson v. Bright
House Networks,
LLC, 2013 WL
1499486 (E.D. Cal.)

contract

irrelevant

Hodson v. DirecTV,
LLC, 2012 WL
5464615 (N.D.
Cal.)

contract

irrelevant

Case
Greer v. 1-800
Flowers.com, Inc.,
2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73961 (S.D.
Tex.)

Description
Court granted 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss
for improper venue. Plaintiff and
defendant both argued that PP was
contract, so court never addressed the
issue. The only question was whether PP
was subject to the choice of venue clause
in defendant’s Terms of Use. Court
concluded that PP “states clearly . . . that
the ‘Privacy Policy is part of the Terms
of Use.’”
Plaintiff, mezzanine financer, borrowed
$4M from defendant bank. No statement
on whether the PP would be enforceable
for consumers, but holding on summary
judgment that it did not apply to nonconsumer plaintiff.
Issue was scope of contract arbitration
clause covering “any dispute.” The
contract also incorporated by reference
PP, and PP suggested Cable Act claims
might be enforced in district court. Court
invoked presumption in favor of
arbitration to resolve ambiguity and
compel arbitration of Cable Act claim.
Court addressed PP only when
discussing scope of arbitration
agreement. Plaintiffs argued that their
claims were under PP, not under
arbitration clause in customer agreement.
Court granted motion to compel
arbitration, finding arbitration clause
worded broadly enough to capture
plaintiff’s claims. No judicial statement
on the merits of the PP’s use as sword or
shield. Review of complaint shows that
plaintiffs did not try to enforce PP, but
claimed only breach of implied contract
to keep information private.
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Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
contract

In re Easysaver
Rewards Litig., 737
F. Supp. 2d 1159
(S.D. Cal. 2010)

contract

contract

In re Google, Inc.
Gmail Litig. (1),
2013 WL 5423918
(N.D. Cal.)

contract

shield

In re Google, Inc.
Gmail Litig. (2),
2014 WL 1102660
(N.D. Cal.)

contract

inapposite

Case
In re American
Airlines, Inc.
Privacy Litig., 2005
WL 3323028 (N.D.
Tex.)

108

Description
Denial of 12(b)(6) motion on contract
claim. Earlier order in the case stated in
summary of complaint: “American’s
website sets out its privacy policy, which
is part of the contract of carriage with
passengers.” 370 F.Supp.2d at 556. This
order did not discuss assent but held that
plaintiff had cured earlier failure to plead
injury. No indication in either opinion of
assent mechanism.
Breach claim concerned not privacy
violation per se, but sharing of payment
information with third party that enrolled
them in rewards program with signup
and monthly charges. Plaintiffs were
enrolled by entering email and esignature in pop-up window during
purchase from florist. Court denied
12(b)(6) motion stating, without
explanation, that terms of use, PP and
other provisions were part of contract
created by purchases from online florist.
Court denied 12(b)(6) motion on
Wiretap Act claim, based on holding that
the wording of TOS and PP did not
capture alleged acts. TOS referenced PP.
Court’s reasoning suggests that if no
violations of TOS or PP, plaintiffs would
have expressly or impliedly consented to
uses of information. No discussion of
whether either was contractually
binding, though it appears that TOS and
perhaps PP were clickwrap. Judge: Koh.
In class certification decision, court
invoked its earlier denial of a 12(b)(6)
motion (2013 WL 5423918). Earlier
holding rejected shield defense based on
holding that PP did not cover plaintiff’s
claims. No new holding with respect to
legal effects of PP. Judge: Koh.
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Case
In re Google, Inc.
Privacy Policy
Litig. (1), 2013 WL
6248499 (N.D.
Cal.)

Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
irrelevant
/ shield

In re Google, Inc.
Privacy Policy
Litig. (2), 58 F.
Supp. 3d 968 (N.D.
Cal. 2014)

contract

contract

In re JetBlue
Airways Corp.
Privacy Litig., 379
F.Supp. 2d 299
(E.D.N.Y. 2005)

contract

contract

In re Northwest
Airlines Privacy
Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10580
(D. Minn.)

no contract

no
contract

Description
Sword: Court granted 12(b)(6) motion
on claim of breach of PP based on
finding that PP permitted alleged
actions.
Shield: Based on holding that PP
established consent, court granted
12(b)(6) motion on claims of
misappropriation of likeness (consent),
California Unfair Competition Law
(disclosure precludes claim of
misrepresentation), and intrusion upon
seclusion (reasonable expectation).
Subsequent order in 2013 WL 6248499.
Plaintiff pled narrower subclass in which
TOS and PP were arguably violated. On
12(b)(2) motion, court rejected
defendant’s arguments that narrower
class was not identified, that plaintiffs
were not members of class, and that
plaintiffs had not pointed to precise
terms. No discussion of mechanisms of
assent, and no defendant challenge to
existence of contract.
On 12(b)(6) motion, court rejected
defendant’s argument that PP was not a
contract, emphasizing that plaintiffs pled
reliance on PP. Court stated reliance was
a fact issue to be considered at class
certification stage. Court then granted
motion to dismiss contract claim based
on failure to plead cognizable injury.
Court granted 12(b)(6) motion. General
statements of policy are not contractual,
and language in defendant’s PP gave
defendant discretion, suggesting not a
contract. Additionally: no allegation of
having read and no allegation of injury.
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Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
irrelevant

In re Yahoo Mail
Litig., 7 F.Supp.3d
1016 (N.D. Cal.
2014)

contract

shield

Johnson v.
Microsoft, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58174 (W.D.
Wash.)

contract

inapposite

Case
In re Sony Gaming
Networks &
Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., 996
F.Supp. 2d 942
(S.D. Cal. 2014)

110

Description
Plaintiff claimed breach of express
warranty based on PP and breach of
implied warranties. Court granted
12(b)(6) motion on express warranty
claims without leave to amend, as
plaintiffs did not address defendant’s
arguments that claims failed as a matter
of California law. Court dismissed
implied warranty claims because
clickwrap user agreement and PP
disclaimed implied warranties, and sale
was not a sale of goods subject to the
UCC. Court denied motion to dismiss
claim that assurances in PP violated state
UDAP statutes.
Plaintiff conceded that both clickwrap
TOS & PP were agreements. On
10(b)(6) motion, court discussed details
of consent rules for Wiretap Act and
found consent in TOS. Stored
Communications Act claim survived
because defendant failed to properly
argue consent in its opening brief,
waiving defense. Judge: Koh.
Microsoft clickwrap EULA (not separate
PP) prohibited transmission of
personally identifying information to
Microsoft. On summary judgment, court
held that transmission of IP addresses
was not personally identifiable
information. With respect to Microsoft’s
security glossary: “Statements or
definitions found on web sites unrelated
to the EULA do not bind or obligate the
parties, and cannot give rise to a claim
for breach of contract.”
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Draft
Restatement
Coding
neither

Klass
Coding
irrelevant

Loeffler v. RitzCarlton Hotel Co.,
2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 44202 (D.
Nev.)

contract

contract

London v. New
Albertson’s, Inc.,
2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76246 (S.D.
Cal.)

neither

irrelevant

Low v. LinkedIn
Corp., 900 F.Supp.
2d 1010 (N.D. Cal.
2010)

neither

irrelevant

Lucky v. Ky. Bank
(In re Lucky), 2011
Bankr. LEXIS 5734
(Bankr. E.D. Ky.)

no contract

irrelevant

Case
Lee v. Picture
People, Inc., 2012
Del. Super. LEXIS
159 (Del. Super.
Ct.)

Description
Plaintiff claimed sharing of photograph
contrary to online PP was breach of
warranty. Court held that UCC
governed. Summary judgment for
defendant. PP did not create an express
warranty because it did not relate to the
quality of the goods. Nor did plaintiff’s
claims fall under UCC implied
warranties.
Court denied 12(b)(6) motion on
contract claims, which were based on PP
and implied agreement to keep
information private. Court emphasized
notice pleading and that plaintiff would
have to demonstrate that PP was
incorporated into customer contract with
hotel: “violation by Defendant of its own
privacy policy, in and of itself, would
not confer a right of action on Plaintiff.”
On 12(b)(6) motion and after
summarizing privacy notices to
consumers, court concluded without
explanation that there was no allegation
of consideration and that that the policy
permitted actions complained of. No
discussion of assent to policy.
12(b)(6) motion on contract claims
granted based on insufficient pleading of
injury. Opinion does not address whether
PP was enforceable as contract. Motion
to dismiss California False Advertising
Law claim granted because plaintiff did
not allege reliance on PP. Defendant did
not invoke PP as shield to claims of
statutory privacy violations. Judge: Koh.
Court granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on contract claim
based on fact that plaintiff provided no
evidence that policy was effect during
the relevant time and did not identify
provisions the defendant breached.
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Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
irrelevant

Meyer v. Christie,
2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79285 (D.
Kan.)

contract

inapposite

Mortensen v.
Bresnan
Communication,
L.L.C., 2010 WL
5140454 (D. Mont.)

contract

shield

Olney v. Job.Com,
Inc., 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
131276 (E.D. Cal.)

neither

inapposite

Case
Mendoza v.
Microsoft, Inc., 1
F.Supp. 3d 533
(W.D. Tex. 2014)

112

Description
Court granted motion to dismiss
complaint for improper venue based on
Terms of Use clause covering “all
disputes related to this contract or the
Service.” Plaintiffs brought only claims
of statutory violations, including state
UDAP statutes. Plaintiff suggested
practices described in PP established
statutory violations and that PP was part
of Terms of Use, which Court used to
illustrate that claims were covered by
choice of venue clause. Court did not
discuss enforceability or legal effect of
PP and held that claims were covered
even if not related to the contract.
Plaintiff was sophisticated real estate
developer. Complaint alleged contract
based on both PP and implied relational
obligation. Based on long-term
relationship with the bank, district court
denied 10(b)(6) motion.
On 12(b)(6) motion, court held
subscriber agreement and PP shielded
defendant against Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and
invasion of privacy claims by
establishing consent. Court denied
motion to dismiss claimed violations of
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and
trespass to chattels, as no notice of
alleged acts in subscriber agreement or
PP.
Although suit was originally brought by
consumer, this decision concerns a thirdparty business defendant’s motion to
dismiss claim by original defendant
business. Court granted 12(b)(6) motion
because of (1) agency relationships, and
(2) browsewrap agreement insufficiently
pled (typeface, etc., citing Be In v.
Google).

Empiricism and Privacy Policies
Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
contract

Padilla v. Dish
Network L.L.C.,
2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 101120
(N.D. Ill.)

neither

irrelevant

Perkins v. LinkedIn
Corp., 53 F.Supp.3d
1190 (N.D. Cal.
2014)

contract

shield

Pinero v. Jackson
Hewitt Tax Serv.
Inc., 594 F.Supp. 2d
710 (E.D. La. 2009)

contract

inapposite

Rudgayzer v.
Yahoo! Inc., 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
161302 (N.D. Cal.)

neither

inapposite

Case
Owens v. Dixie
Motor Co., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59006 (E.D. Cal.)

Description
Auto financing contract of adhesion,
with plaintiff claiming breach of express
and implied duties to safeguard
information. No discussion of how
plaintiff agreed to published PP. Court
denied defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, focusing on injury,
consideration and specificity of terms.
Alleged breach involved release of credit
and personal information to imprisoned
felon.
Plaintiff claimed breach of implied
contract based on use of data. In 12(b)(6)
motion, defendant argued that PP
permitted actions. Plaintiff withdrew
breach of implied contract claim. Court
denied permission to amend complaint to
allege violation of PP, as plaintiff had
not plausibly alleged damages.
Clickwrap User Agreement and PP.
12(b)(6) motion granted for claimed
violations Stored Communications Act
and Wiretap Act, and some right of
publicity claims, based on detailed
analysis of consent rules. No discussion
of whether PP was a contract term.
Judge: Koh.
Plaintiff signed PP in defendant tax
return preparer’s offices. Court granted
12(b)(6) motion based on failure to plead
compensable damages. No argument that
policy was not enforceable.
Not a separate privacy policy, but
clickwrap TOS. Court granted 12(b)(6)
motion based on no alleged actual injury.
Pro se.
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Case
Smith v. Trusted
Universal Stds. in
Elec. Transactions,
Inc., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43360
(D.N.J.)

Vol. 36, 2019

Draft
Restatement
Coding
contract

Klass
Coding
contract

Starkey v. Staples,
Inc., 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
186592 (M.D.
Tenn.)

no contract

no
contract

Svenson v. Google
Inc., 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43902
(N.D. Cal.)

contract

contract

Toney v. Quality
Resources, Inc., 75
F.Supp.3d 727
(N.D. Ill. 2014)

neither

shield
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Description
Court held on 12(b)(6) motion, and
giving pro se plaintiff “benefit of the
doubt,” that plaintiff sufficiently pled (1)
that PP was part of cable provider
agreement and (2) that plaintiff relied on
PP. Court nonetheless dismissed contract
claim, holding (3) that “even assuming”
contract exists, plaintiff failed to plead
injury. Other defendants’ PPs were not
contracts, as plaintiff was not in
contractual relationship with them. Pro
se.
Poor pleading and possibly overly
litigious plaintiff. Plaintiff paid store to
have document printed from a thumb
drive. Court granted 12(b)(6) motion,
holding that general policy does not
create a contract with in-store customer.
Pro se.
On 12(b)(6) motion, court held that
clickwrap assent to TOS incorporating
PP sufficed to show existence of
contract. Court also rejected defendant’s
argument that damages were
insufficiently pled.
Defendant against Telephone Consumer
Protection Act claim argued PP was
consent to use of phone number for
marketing calls. Court read statute as
requiring express consent and treated
12(b)(6) motion as request for summary
judgment. Court found (1) no evidence
that plaintiff saw or agreed to PP, thus
not satisfying express consent
requirement, and (2) that statement in
policy was not clear enough to put
plaintiff on notice of data uses.

Empiricism and Privacy Policies

Case
Trikas v. Universal
Card Servs. Corp.,
351 F.Supp. 2d 37
(E.D.N.Y. 2005)

Yunker v. Pandora,
2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30829 (N.D.
Cal.)

Draft
Restatement
Coding
neither

Klass
Coding
irrelevant

contract

contract

Description
Court granted summary judgment to
defendant on contract claim based on
plaintiff’s failure to plead injury. Court
declined to rule on whether policy was a
contract, but quoted Dyer for principle
that ““broad statements of company
policy do not generally give rise to
contract claims, so might have been
coded as no contract. Pro se.
On 12(b)(6) motion, defendant claimed
PP was not a contract. Magistrate held
without explanation that pleadings
sufficed “at this stage in the
proceedings.” No discussion of
mechanisms of assent.
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